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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF Myron K. Jordan for the Master 
of Arts in History presented February 28, 1975. 
Title: Reconciliation and Reunion. 
APPROVED BY MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITTEE: 
Throughout the period of the American Revolution, 
Great Britain pursued a policy of reconciliation and reunion 
toward its North American colonies. While this was but one 
of the several policy alternatives open to British leader-
ship, it was always an element of British strategy toward 
the colonies from 1775 to 1783. 
This thesis follows the evolution of reconciliation 
and reunion in the final days of crisis in 1774-1775. It 
seeks to define its development during the war itself, and 
especially during the abortive American Peace Commission of 
2 
1778. By tracing this policy from its emergence through to 
the peacemaking in 1782-1783, it shows its growth and ana-
lyzes its strengths and weaknesses as a coherent whole 
rather than considering it in relation to particular events. 
This provides an understanding of why reconciliation and 
reunion had become the dominant and controlling policy 
toward America at the time of the Anglo-American negotia-
tions leading to the Treaty of Paris. 
British policy in the critical period of the peace-
making at Paris from April, 1782 through February, 1783 was 
predicated upon reconciliation and reunion with America. 
However, insufficient weight has been given to this fact in 
analyzing these events. Benjamin Franklin's suggestion to 
Richard Oswald, Britain's representative, in April, 1782 
that Britain cede Canada to the United States has been con-
sidered either an inexplicable aberration in Franklin's 
conduct, or simply labeled as baffling. With an understand-
ing of British policy this event becomes a clear American 
response to Britain, pointing out to Britain's leading advo-
cate of reconciliation and reunion, Lord Shelburne, the 
price which such a policy would require for American accept-
ance of a plan of reunion. 
Most important of all is the role of reconciliation 
and reunion in fixing the terms of the Treaty of Paris. The 
American historical record has emphasized the parts played 
3 
by Franklin, John Jay and John Adams. It has given far less 
consideration and weight to that of Lord Shelburne, who as 
Colonial Secretary and as First Lord of the Treasury, di-
rected negotiations from the British side. Shelburne's 
advocacy of reconciliation and reunion set the outlines of 
peace and contributed significantly to the terms. The 
reversal of British policy following Shelburne's fall in 
February, 1783, and the failure of the new North-Fox Minis-
try to reach agreement on a commercial treaty with America 
highlights the importance of Shelburne 1 s role. Any evalua-
tion of American diplomacy at Paris to be comprehensive must 
take into account the policies of Great Britai.n and their 
impact on negotiations. The accounting as developed in this 
thesis, based upon primary materials available in the 
Portland State University Library and the Bodleian Library 
of Oxford University, demonstrates what has been hailed as 
American diplomatic success is much more attributable to 
British policy than to American efforts. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE NEGLECTED POLICY OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
American historians exploring the diplomacy of war and 
peace during the American Revolution have mined a variety of 
themes from this Mother Lode of diplomatic history. But 
their main conceptions of the events from 1773 to 1783 have 
been shaped into an essentially simple confrontation between 
good and evil. That is, the American forces of independence 
as symbolized by the diplomacy of Benjamin Franklin, John 
Jay and John Adams are pitted against the efforts of King 
George III's diplomats striving to reclaim for the British 
Empire the lost North American colonies. Thus, the climac-
tic diplomatic maneuvering at Paris in 1782 becomes in 
the eyes of these historians an epic struggle for America's 
survival as a nation. 
"Their action," says Samuel Bemis of the American 
negotiators at Paris, 
was the first decisive step to loose a new nation 
from Europe's bonds and Europe's distresses, so that 
their people after them might have freedom to expand, 
and to develop a new continent, to rise to surpass-
ing power, and to do this during that century and a 
half which was to follow before the industrial and 
scientific revolutions of our times • • • • The 
greatest victory in the annals of American diplomacy 
was won at the outset by Franklin, Jay and Adams.I 
More recently Richard Morris has reaffirmed these 
broad outlines of American diplomacy at Paris. 
"What was so remarkable," he writes, 
about the achievements of the American commissioners 
was that where they compromised it was on the in-
essentials and where they conceded it was to yield 
the trivial. From beginning to end they remained un-
swerving on the score of obtaining both absolute in-
dependence and a continental domain for thirteen 
littoral states. On the main objectives of national 
survival they proved uncompromising. Because the 
American commissioners resolutely contended for the 
right of a sovereign people to choose their own form 
of government and because they secured grudging 
recognition of that right from the Old Order, a free 
people is eternally in their debt.2 
2 
These conceptions reflect some of the generally 
accepted views of American diplomatic history in the revolu-
tionary era. Yet they are views with serious shortcomings. 
They are constructed much more from hindsight than from the 
contemporary realities of 1782. They rest upon a broad 
foundation of the American perception of national mission. 
They also emphasize an unqualified acceptance of American 
independence in 1782 as an essential to present national 
existence. They disregard the efforts made by both 
Americans and English at reconciliation and reunion before 
l Samuel F. Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American 
Revolution (Bloomington, Indiana, 1957, 1935) p. 256. 
2Richard B. Morris, The Peacemakers (New York, 1965) 
p. 459. 
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and during the war period. And finally there is a signifi-
cant misreading of British policy and objectives at Paris in 
1782. All of these factors combined pose an unanswered and 
perhaps unanswerable question: What impact did Britain's 
policy of reconciliation and reunion have in the shaping of 
the ultimate terms of the Treaty of Paris? 
Both Bemis and Morris stress some common thoughts in 
their paean of praise to the American commissioners at 
Paris. First, of course, is their achievement of independ-
ence. Second, the wresting of sufficient territory from 
Great Britain so that an expansionist sentiment in America 
would not find itself thwarted for many years. Third, the 
clean break of all political ties between the new nation and 
Europe, and what that presaged in·terms of national charac-
ter and the sense of national mission. 
The United States has indeed achieved and maintained 
its national independence. The achievement of that inde-
pendence in confrontation with the Old Order in Europe and 
its establishment of a distinctive form of government from 
what currently existed helped strengthen the sense of mis-
sion which is a pervasive theme throughout almost all 
American historical writing. It finds its earliest expres-
sion in the religious dedication of the New England 
colonies, and the firmly expressed belief of their leaders 
in God's guidance of their destiny. 
4 
The nationhood of America is a necessity to further-
ance of the idea of mission. It permitted Americans to view 
themselves and their government as unique largely because of 
the circumstances of their separation from the Old World and 
their break with the links to the European past. These con-
tribute to the idea that this nation is God's experiment in 
religious, political and economic ideals in order to provide 
leadership to the rest of the world. 
No one has more effectively articulated America's own 
belief in its mission to the world than its sixteenth presi-
dent, Abraham Lincoln, in his Gettysburg address. " 
That this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of free-
dom--and that government of the people, by the people, for 
the people, shall not perish from the earth,"3 are simple 
but powerful words which have conveyed to succeeding genera-
tions an urgent sense of America's belief in its own special 
destiny. 
It is a theme that has been repeated many times before 
and since Lincoln's speech. The same American sense of mis-
sion is easy to find in the justifications of America's 
involvement in Cuba and in the Philippines in 1898. In ask-
ing Congress to declare war on Germany, April 2, 1917, 
President Woodrow Wilson sounded the same chords of mission. 
3T. Harry Williams, A. Lincoln, Selected Speeches, 
Messages and Letters (New York, 1957) p. 247. 
He said: 
It is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful 
people into war, into the most terrible and disas-
trous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be 
in the balance. But the right is more precious than 
the peace, and we shall fight for the things we have 
always carried nearest our hearts--for democracy, for 
the right of those who submit to authority to have a 
voice in their own governments, for the rights and 
liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion 
of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall 
bring peace and safety to all nations and make the 
world at last free.4 
The same American sense of mission can be traced 
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through Franklin Roosevelt's Atlantic Charter and Harry 
Truman's March 12, 1947 foreign policy message to Congress 
or as it has become better known, the Truman Doctrine. Mis-
sion is an ideal woven into the fabric of American history 
from colonial beginnings. It was re-dedicated through inde-
pendence in the eighteenth century and surges undiminished 
down to the Viet-Nam conflict in the twentieth century. And 
because it is so fundamental to the thinking of Americans 
it should be in no way surprising that those historians who 
have written of the diplomacy of 1782 subconsciously shaped 
their views to accommodate the idea of American mission. 
What were the objectives of the English ministry in 
regard to its North American colonies in the critical days 
of 1773 to 1775 immediately prior to the outbreak of hos-
tilities? 
4Harold C. Syrett, editor, American Historical 
Documents (New York, 1960) p. 342. 
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How did these British aims change with the shifting 
fortunes of war in North America, the West Indies and 
Europe? What adjustments were made in British policy as new 
European alliances threatened Great Britain? Did other 
developments within the Empire impinge upon the American 
policy of Great Britain at critical moments? 
What were the objectives pursued by the British minis-
try and its negotiators when faced with a major defeat at 
Yorktown and a Parliamentary resolution demanding a halt to 
offensive operations in North America? 
Reconciliation and reunion were policies followed by 
the English Ministry prior to Lexington in concert with the 
Ministerial plan of coercion. Reconciliation and reunion 
were objectives pursued along with military action through-
out the American hostilities. And they were also prime 
objectives of Lord Shelburne's representatives at the peace 
negotiations of 1782 in Paris. 
That Lord Shelburne, leader of the King's cabinet 
during the peace negotiations, made the final desperate 
effort to bridge the gap between Great Britain and its North 
American colonies and achieve reconciliation and reunion is 
well documented by British historians. Vincent Harlow's 
The- Founding of the Second British Empire contains a 
detailed exploration of Lord Shelburne's belief in the pos-
sibility of a new relationship between England and the 
thirteen colonies. Shelburne's biographer, Edmond Fitz-
maurice, perceived it as well. 
He (Shelburne) saw the settlement not as surrender 
to America under French pressure, nor even a rever-
sal of North's blunders, but as the opening of a new 
and more glorious period of British history. This 
view of it he was unable, however, to make clear 
either to his contemporaries or even to historians. 
Shelburne believed that America might yet be kept 
within the British area of influence even though he 
was obliged to cede her independence. 
To make it possible it was essential that Ameri-
cans should concentrate their attention on the 
interior of their continent and that they should 
feel good will towards Great Britaln.5 
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A more recent British historian is equally explicit. 
Shelburne 
••• saw that America could not be kept by force . 
. But he hoped that the Americans might be content 
with independence in the sense of running their 
domestic affairs but would voluntarily unite their 
foreign policy and co-ordinate their trade policy 
with that of the King. All that was valuable in 
the old connexion would then be preservect.6 
Why should such a significant aspect of British 
foreign policy in the American Revolution have received so 
little attention from American historians? 
Part of the answer has already been discussed--the 
American idea of mission that is so accepted and so 
fundamental it can be considered a part of the fiber of 
5Edmond Fitzmaurice, Life of William Petty, Earl or 
Shelburne (2 vols., London, 1912) II, 253. 
6J. Steven Watson, The Reign of George III (Oxford, 
1960) p. 249. 
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American life. It is also an idea that must rest upon a 
foundation of independence. The two thoughts support each 
other, and because they are inseparable, both ideas have 
become a premise to American historical thinking. Most 
Americans experience great difficulty in deliberately exam-
ining these ideas from an objective standpoint. 
It is obvious that the idea of reconciliation and re-
union is an outright denial of both American nationhood and 
its corollary, American mission. Even the consideration of 
reconciliation and reunion in a revolutionary setting is 
fraught with overtones of disloyalty. The historian brave 
enough to pursue these themes in a very young republic is 
treading upon the treacherously thin ice of treason. (It is 
noteworthy few Americans saw fit to write contemporary biog-
raphies of such men as Benedict Arnold or Aaron Burr.) Cer-
tainly it is a subject with little appeal to a popular 
audience or an academic one. 
So reconciliation and reunion have remained topics for 
a relative few British historians to examine. And even from 
the British viewpoint the middle way policies of the Minis-
try in wartime and during the peace negotiations have drawn 
minor interest. The reasons are probably several. The 
architects of a peace ending a disastrous war seldom draw 
accolades from their contemporaries or even later his-
torians. "Are we to be hanged or applauded for this 
9 
rescuing you from the American war?" Henry Strachey, a mem-
ber of the British negotiating team at Paris wrote to a 
friend after the preliminary peace terms were disclosed.7 
Lord Shelburne's ministry fell from power over the questions 
raised by the Treaty of Paris, and Shelburne himself never 
again held office. 
The questions of loyalty and patrlotlsm were as crlt-
ical in England as they were in America. To those in 
England who saw American grievances as the conspiratorial 
efforts at independence of a wrong-headed lot of colonial 
tax dodgers, the idea of a genuine reconciliation and re-
union remained as treasonable as the terms of the Treaty of 
Paris. Reconciliation with criminals is unacceptable 
whether their crime be tax evasion or a conspiracy to split 
off the North American colonies from the remainder of the 
British Empire. 
Writing to Lord Shelburne .about the imminent recogni-
tion of American independence on November 10, 1782, King 
George III probably expressed the feelings of many of his 
subjects toward America when he said: 
I cannot conclude without mentioning how sensibly 
I feel the dismemberment of America from this Em-
pire, and that I should be miserable indeed if I 
did not feel that no blame on that Account can be 
laid at my door, and did I not also know that 
knavery seems to be so much the striking feature 
7Fitzmaurice, The Life of William Petty, Earl of 
Shelburne, II, 207. 
of its Inhabitants that it may not in the end b~ 
an evil that they become Alien to this Kingdom.~ 
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On the other hand, those few Englishmen who supported 
the American cause and hence independence found themselves 
trapped in the same American national ideology as most 
American historians. Reconciliation and reunion was as 
treacherous a role for a British supporter of America as it 
was for Americans. 
Certainly, the middle way is the most difficult path 
of all in an era of conflict. And the middle way is pre-
cisely what reconciliation and reunion between the North 
American colonies and Great Britain sought to accomplish. 
It is easy to understand and define the policies of those 
seeking American independence. The goal is clear and sharp. 
It is equally easy to delineate the ideas of those seeking 
to restore loyalty to the Crown and Parliament through 
colonial submission. Extremes are usually easier to locate 
than the slippery middle ground between dedicated advocates. 
This policy of reconciliation and reunion was, how-
ever, a major thrust of British diplomacy throughout the 
American Revolution and an overriding concern of Great 
Britain at the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Paris. 
Our task will be: To gather the threads of this idea as it 
8s1r John Fortescue, editor, Correspondence of K~~ 
George III (6 vols., London, 1928) VI, 154. 
11 
was shared by both Americans and Britons in the years just 
prior to 1776 and America's claim to independence. To fol-
low the efforts of Lord North and Benjamin Franklin to find 
the common grounds for accommodation in their secret nego-
tiations of 1774 and 1775. To examine the proposals for 
conciliation Lord Howe brought to America in 1776, and look 
again at the efforts of the Carlisle Commission in 1776. 
And most important of all, to scrutinize with care the last 
desperate hope for reconciliation and reunion in Lord 
Shelburne's plan for peace with America as one of the ele-
ments in shaping the ultimate terms of the Treaty of Paris, 
1782. 
The questions to be answered are difficult ones: How 
much did Britain's policy of reconciliation and reunion con-
tribute to what Bemis and Morris as well as other American 
historians have seen as the triumph of tough, shrewd U.S. 
diplomacy? Why did British policy fall short of its objec-
tives? 
In brief, has our American sense of mission blinded us 
to the British perspective ~n the Treaty of Paris, and mis-
led historians in their evaluation of what has been hailed 
as the first and greatest success in American diplomacy? 
CHAPTER II 
ACCOMMODATION--ANOTHER WORD FOR 
RECONCILIATION AND REUNION 
The threads of reconciliation and reunion between 
Great Britain and America can be easily discerned at many 
points in the years between the Peace of Paris (1763) and 
the Treaty of Paris (1783). For our purposes, the best 
starting point is 1774. It was a year that produced un-
mistakable evidence of the increasing strains on the 
imperial ties linking Britain and America. But it also gave 
indications of the strong counterforces to separation. 
There were developments that pointed to both British and 
American desires for accommodation and continuation of the 
American colonies within the Empire. 
It was a critical year both from the standpoint of 
Great Britain and the colonists. Reacting to the mob vio-
lence of the Boston Tea Party in December, 1773, Lord North, 
First Lord of the Treasury and thus head of the Cabinet, on 
March 7, 1774 told Commons it was His Majesty's intention, 
" ••• to put an immediate stop to the present disorders 
• • • The King's message also asked Parliament to 
1The Parliamentary History of England (29 vols. 
London, 1814 New York, 1966 ) XVII, 1159. 
• • • take into their most serious consideration, 
what further regulations and permanent provisions 
may be necessary to be established, for better 
securing the execution of the laws and the Just 
dependance Lsic) of the colonies upon the crown and 
parliament of Great Britain.2 
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In retrospect, North was painfully aware of the errors 
of his predecessors, Rockingham, Chatham and Grafton. Back-
ing and filling in the face of colonial intransigence had 
been a total failure. Weakness on the part of England when 
confronted with threats of non-importation or intimidation 
of the King's officials by American mobs had been followed 
by the repeal of legislation intended to equalize the bur-
den of taxation between England and the colonies. The end 
result of these compromises had led to nothing more than new 
violence and further intimidation. North, the King and the 
Ministry were convinced a new policy of firmness toward the 
American colonies was a necessity. 
Between March and June, 1774, the North Ministry 
introduced to Parliament and won approval by substantial 
majorities of a series of measures designed to establish 
beyond doubt its imperial authority in America. The first 
to pass was the Boston Port Bill. It closed the Port of 
Boston to commerce until the East India Company had been 
paid for its loss in tea. The Boston Customs House was re-
located in Salem as was the seat of Provincial Government by 
the same Act. The American Board of Customs was also trans-
14 
ferred to Salem. North pointed out there was ample prece-
dent for the punishment of an entire community for the acts 
of individuals. II Boston had been the ringleader in 
all riots," North declared, 
and had at all times shown a desire of seeing the 
laws of Great Britain attempted in vain, in the 
colony of Massachusetts Bay. That the act of the 
mob in destroying the tea, and other proceedings 
belonged to the act of a public meeting, and that 
. . . other colonies were peaceable and well in-
clined towards the trade of this country . • 3 
While the Boston Port Bill was directed at Boston and 
its street mobs, the Bill for regulating the Government of 
Massachusetts Bay had broader implications. North outlined 
its purpose. "I propose, in this Bill," he told Commons on 
March 28, 1774, 
to take the executive power from the hands of the 
democratic- part of government; I would propose, that 
the governor should act as a justice of peace, and 
that he should have the power to appoint the offi-
cers throughout the whole civil authority, such as 
sheriffs, provost marshal, &c .••• I would have 
them only removable by His Majesty . . • Every 
gentleman will naturally see the impropriety of such 
irregular assemblies, or town meetings, which are 
now held in Boston; I would have them brought under 
some regulation, and would not suffer them to be 
held without consent of the governor, unless upon 
the annual election of certain officers . • • • 
Their juries are improperly chosen.4 
In brief, the Bill for regulating the government of 
Massachusetts Bay as proposed by North and approved by 
3 Ibid., p. 1165. 
4 Ibid., p. 1193. 
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Parliament was a drastic revision of the colony's charter. 
The elected council to the royal governor was eliminated in 
favor of a council nominated by the King. The elected 
assembly was stripped of its appointive powers, and the 
governor given authority to appoint and dismiss all subordi-
nate officials, including local sheriffs and judges. Town 
meetings were limited to one per year, and their role con-
strained to local matters. Only the governor could 
authorize additional town meetings.5 
The significance of the Massachusetts Bay Act was 
plain in both England and America. There was a new tough-
ness of mind, and firmness of policy in the Ministry. The 
words ". • . ju st dependance ••• 116 were not mere Parlia-
mentary rhetoric. They were an articulation of policy which 
was about to be supported by concerted action. 
The third item on North's legislative agenda for 
colonial reform in the spring of 1774 was the Bill for the 
Impartial Administration of Justice in Massachusett's Bay. 
"Unless," North explained," such a Bill as this now proposed 
should pass into law, the executive power will be unwilling 
to act, thinking they will not have a fair trial without 
1t."7 In final form, this measure permitted persons accused 
5rb1d. 
6Ibid., p. 1159 
7rbid., p. 1200 
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of capital crimes in the performance of their official 
duties to have their trials transferred to another colony or 
to Great Britain if they chose. 
The capstone to North's program was a Quartering Act. 
It gave colonial governors greater authority in lodging 
troops in uninhabited houses, barns and farm structures, and 
if need be in private homes. North was clearly prepared to 
back up the instruments of his new hard-line policy in 
America, the King's officials, with force and military 
power. "The Americans have tarred and feathered your sub-
jects," he told Parliament in the course of the debate on 
the Administration of Justice Act, 
plundered your merchants, burnt your ships, denied 
all obedience to your laws and authority; yet so 
clement, and so long forbearing has our conduct been, 
that it is incumbent on us now to take a different 
course. Whatever may be the consequence, ~e must 
risk something; if we do not, all is over. 
All four measures achieved substantial majorities in 
both houses of Parliament despite the opposition of the 
Chatham faction, Edmund Burke and a handful of dissenters. 
It seems evident from the ease with which North's policy 
gained Parliamentary support that his position indeed re-
flected the views of a majority of the politically active 
British public. 
Americans quickly lumped the so-called coercive acts--
that is, North's four-point program of re-establishing the 
8 Ibid., p. 1280. 
17 
Just dependance of the colonies on Great Britain--with the 
Quebec Act. The five legislative matters relating to North 
America considered by Parliament in the spring of 1774 were 
thus deemed to constitute a single category of deliberately 
inflammatory legislation aimed at America. The connection, 
however, appears to be more a matter of coincidence in 
timing than a single overall plan. 
The need to establish an appropriate form of civil 
government for Canada was long-standing. The Quebec Act, 
approved in June, 1774 immediately following North's first 
four proposals regarding colonial matters, was an effort to 
recognize the French culture and Roman Catholic·religion of 
the inhabitants of the territory won from France in the 
Peace of Paris (1763). By extending the Quebec boundary 
southward along the Pennsylvania border and the Ohio River 
it was hoped to stabilize the Indian frontier and reduce the 
recurring fr~ction between land-hungry colonists and 
Indians. From the British viewpoint, it was a statesmanlike 
recognition of the special needs of Canadians for a respon-
sive government in that territory. It appeared to offer 
equally hopeful means toward controlling defense require-
ments by eliminating the source of Indian reaction--colonial 
incursions westward. Only a petition from the Penns point-
ing out the possible conflict between their colonial grant 
and the new Quebec boundaries reflected any American concern 
in the Parliamentary debate on the Act. Lord North dis-
missed the question as a misinterpretation.9 
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The combination of the four coercive acts plus the 
Quebec Act raised the tensions between Great Britain and the 
colonies to a new level. The four acts aimed at restoring 
the King's peace in Massachusetts Bay were a long overdue 
step toward firmness in confronting the issues of radical-
ism and rioting. From the London perspective it was ex-
pected that singling out Massachusetts would divide the 
colonists among themselves and encourage rival ports in the 
Middle and Southern colonies to prosper at the expense of 
Boston. 10 The reform of the Massachusetts Bay charter would 
serve as a warning to radicals in other colonies to temper 
their speech and actions in their assemblies as well as to 
make them more respectful in their dealings with royal 
governors. Providing an option for moving trials of offi-
cials to other colonies or England would rally the support 
of those loyal to the King and stiffen the backbones of 
those charged with enforcing the laws of the Empire. And 
finally, the Quartering Act would make clear the responsi-
bilities of the colonists in making a minimal contribution 
to the forces bringing law and order amongst them and in 
defending them against Indian attack. 
9rbid., p. 1407. 
10 6 Ibid., p. 11 5. 
19 
Logical and reasonable though North's policies may 
have appeared to Parliament and to Britons, it ignited an 
explosion of reaction on the American side of the Atlantic. 
Calls arose for a cessation of trade with Britain. Com-
mittees of safety organized and gathered supplies. For the 
first time since 1765 and the Stamp Act crisis colonial 
assemblies voted to send delegates to a Continental Con-
gress. Militia companies formed and drilled. There 
remained in the face of these preparations, however, solid 
evidence of an American desire for accommodation and con-
tinued union with Great Britain. 
When the First Continental Congress met in September, 
1774 in Philadelphia, it gave serious consideration to a 
Plan of Union proposed by Joseph Galloway, former speaker of 
the Pennsylvania Assembly. Galloway's plan called for the 
establishment of a Grand Council of representatives chosen 
by the legislatures of all British colonies in North 
America. A President-General, appointed by the King, would 
act as chief executive. The Council's power would extend 
to all matters of a commercial, civil, criminal or police 
character, but reserve to the Parliament in Great Britain 
the prerogatives of defense and foreign affairs. The Grand 
Council would have had veto power over measures affecting 
the North American colonies passed by Parliament. Likewise, 
20 
Parliament would have retained veto power over acts of the 
Grand Council. 11 
Galloway later praised those who supported his pro-
posal in Congress for seeking" ... to form a more solid 
and constitutional union between the two countries, and to 
avoid every measure which tended to sedition • 1112 
Congress was split into two factions, Galloway observed. 
The one were men of legal principles and possessed 
the greatest fortunes in America; the others were 
congregational and presbyterian republicans, or men 
of bankrupt fortunes, overwhelmed in debt to the 
British merchants.13 
Indeed, Galloway noted that one of the delegates to Con-
gress, Samuel Adams of Massachusetts Bay, openly admitted 
he had been toiling for twenty years to destroy Anglo-
American ties and to bring about American independence.14 
Despite its failure, the Galloway plan was evidence 
But 
that many Americans--perhaps most Americans--still thought 
of themselves as British subjects and their rights secured 
by the English constitution. The same Congress which set 
aside Galloway's plan voted a declaration of rights and 
11Richard B. Morris, editor, The American Revolution, 
1763-1783 (New York, 1970) p. 128. 
12Joseph Galloway, Historical and Political Reflec-
tions on the Rise and Progress of the American Rebellion 
TLondon, 1 780) p .06 . -
13Ib1d. 
14 Ibid., p. 67. 
i_ 
resolves. Among the rights claimed were, 
That our ancestors, who first settled these colo-
nies, were at the time of their emigration from the 
mother country, entitled to all the rights, liber-
ties and immunities of free and natural-born sub-
jects within the realm of England. That by such 
emigration they by no means forfeited, surrendered 
or lost any of these rights, but that they were, 
and their descendents now are, entitled to the ex-
ercise and enjoyment of all such of them ..•• 15 
21 
Congress addressed this appeal to Parliament, declar-
ing it was acting" ... as Englishmen their ancestors in 
like cases have usually done, for asserting and vindicating 
their rights and liberties .... 16 
The Declaration concluded: 
To these grievous acts and measures Americans can-
not submit, but in hopes that their fellow subjects 
in Great Britain will, on revision of them, restore 
us to that state in which both countries found hap-
piness and prosperity •.•• 17 
The Congressional petition outlining American grievances was 
presented to the American Secretary, Lord Dartmouth, by 
Benjamin Franklin, agent for Pennsylvania in London. It was 
accepted by Parliament with a bundle of other colonial cor-
respondence without discussion or answer. 18 
15Harold C. Syrett, editor, American Historical Docu-
ments (New York, 1960) p. 75. 
16Ibid. 
1 7 lb id • ' p . 77 . 
18 B D. Bargar, Lord Dartmouth and American Revolu-
tion (University of South Carolina Press, 1965) p. 154. 
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In England men were also trying to devise a new rela-
tionship between Great Britain and the colonies that would 
solve the growing frictions. As early as 1770, an anonymous 
London pamphleteer had suggested colonial representation in 
Parliament under the title, Considerations on the Expediency 
of Admitting Representatives from the American Colonies into 
the British House of Commons. After commenting on separa-
tion, "Such a disunion would be a dreadful event both to 
19 
Great Britain and America ... " the unknown author in-
sisted that America's interests were already represented 
in Commons by the British merchants trading to America. 
Representation, however, he predicted, would quiet American 
grievances. 
About fourscore persons might be admitted to sit in 
Parliament as members of the Commons House of Parlia-
ment for all the King's dominions in America, the 
West Indies as well as North America, and their title 
might be bhat of Commissioners of the Colonies of 
America.2 
The difficulties of transatlantic travel were so great the 
pamphlet proposed the American Commissioners would continue 
to sit without the necessity of standing for re-election 
until they were challenged. 
Another 1775 pamphlet issued in London by T. Beckett, 
printer, declared, 
l9Anonymous, Considerations on the Expediency of 
Admitting Representatives from the American Colonies into 
the British House of Commons (London, 1770) p. 3. 
20 Ibid., p. 10. 
'• 
If receiving representatives from America be practi-
cable, why not admit them? If it is proper to incor-
porate the colonies and make them a part of the 
parent-state instead of distant provinces, why not 
deliberate about it?21 
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But Major John Cartwright, whose American Independ-
ence, the Interest and Glory of Great Britain, also appeared 
in a London pamphlet in 1775, argued against American repre-
sentation in Parliament for a number of reasons. The small 
number of American representatives in Commons would make 
their role ineffectual, he pointed out. There were also 
practical considerations. Should Americans be permitted the 
privilege of debate and a vote on all matters before Commons 
22 
or only on questions concerning the colonies? The thought 
of American members of Parliament perhaps casting the crit-
ical votes on the taxes of Bristol merchants or Kentish 
farmers was beyond even Cartwright's imagination. Given the 
hazards and slowness of North Atlantic travel, how would 
_Americans at Westminister visit their constituents and sit 
in Parliament?23 After raising these questions, Cartwright 
concluded, "But we may rest assured, that while Americans 
are awake, they will never consent to it. 1124 
21Anonymous, A Plain State of the Arguments Between 
Great Britain and Her Colonies (London, 1775) p. 18. 
22John Cartwright, American Independence, the Interest 
and Glory of Great Britain (London, 1775) p. 9. 
2 3Ibid. 
24Ib1d. 
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Cartwright's alternative to representation in Parlia-
ment--a surprising one for a former British naval officer 
who had served on the Newfoundland station--was American 
independence of special kind. Cartwright pointed out that 
" ••• the American governments . are independent 
nations, having within themselves the rights and the actual 
powers of legislation ..•. 1125 Cartwright foresaw the day 
when the benefits of the British constitution would grad-
ually extend over North America 11 ••• to as many independ-
ent states as can find habitations on the vast American 
continent 1126 Cartwright's use of the word "inde-
pendence" takes on a somewhat novel connotation as he pur-
sues his theme. 
In analyzing the impasse of 1775, Cartwright leaned on 
another frequent commentator on American politics and trade, 
Josiah Tucker, Dean of Gloucester Cathedral. Tucker, 
according to Cartwright, identified five possible solutions 
to the American problem. First, Britain could permit mat-
ters to drift as they were in early 1775 with constant bick-
ering and threats between t.he two parties. Second, Great 
Britain could meet American grievances by offering repre-
sentation in Parliament. Third, Britain could throw the 
weight of its army and navy against the colonists and rule 
25 Ibid., p. 22. 
26 ~., p. 27. 
America by force--a project ex-naval officer Cartwright 
thought might require considerable time and expense. 
Fourth, it could consider moving the seat of the British 
Empire to North America and rule England from thence as a 
colony. Fifth, it could grant independence to the colo-
nies.27 
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Tucker's fifth option was the only one worth seriously 
considering, Cartwright said, and declared he looked forward 
to the day" .•. when Great Britain shall once have done 
justice to the Americans, by an open declaration of their 
independence, and by offering them her friendship. 1128 
For Cartwright saw American independence leading to a 
II 
• Grand British League and Confederacy to be entered 
into by All the States of British America. 1129 It would be 
accomplished by an Act of Parliament separating the colonies 
from the United Kingdom, but at the same time including 
.•. in another clause ... that "the Parliament of 
Great Britain doth further declare itself to be the 
guardian and protector of said states and colonies 
3 • • • against every foreign power whatsoever • . • " 0 
27Ibid., p. 47. 
28Ibid., p. 57. 
29Ibid., p. 1. 
30ib1d., p. 63. 
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The same act, according to Cartwright, should direct Parlia-
ment to enter into a treaty with America 
• in order that a firm, brotherly, and per-
petual league may be concluded between Great 
Britain and them [the American colonies) for their 
mutual commercial "'benefit, and their joint secur-31 ity against all other kingdoms and states ••.• 
King George III would continue in his role as King of 
America, Cartwright was hopeful, and expressed his convic-
tion that a grateful America would rely on Great Britain for 
military and naval protection under what might be described 
today as dominion status. 
'Tis absurd to imagine they will act in contradic-
tion to the principles of self-interest and self-
preserva ti on, merely because they shall be free from 
controul; nor is it more possible to conceive, how 
they should object to a treaty with Great Britain 
merely because she had just done them an act of 
magnanimity and generosity unparalleled in history 
.•.• 32 
Cartwright brought his entire thesis into perspective with 
this blunt, closing admonition: "In short, the multiplying 
millions of America must either be our deadly foes, or our 
steadfast friends--Great Britain take the choice~ 11 33 
Men in government as well as pamphleteers sought to 
find the elusive common ground of successful accommodation. 
In August, 1774, Franklin, as a colonial agent in London, 
3libid. 
32Ibid., p. 67. 
33
rbid., p. 68. 
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met with the aging Lord Chatham, William Pitt the Elder, at 
Chatham's urging.34 It opened the way for Franklin to dis-
cuss with Chatham American grievances and the means of sat-
isfying them. As the American situation worsened, Chatham 
introduced a conciliation motion in the House of Lords on 
January 20, 1775. It was swiftly defeatect.35 Chatham 
returned to the struggle on February 1st, introducing a bill 
aimed at resolving the differences between Britain and the 
colonies. It proposed to permit the colonial assemblies all 
rights of taxation, but acknowledged the supremacy of Par-
liament in matters of Empire trade regulation and defense. 
Acts passed by Parliament since 1763 to which the colonies 
objected would have been repealed. Again Chatham's proposal 
was quickly defeated.36 Not even· a person of Pitt's stature 
was capable of deflecting the North Ministry from its course 
in America. 
Another member of Parliament who spoke out for con-
ciliation was Edmund Burke, whose classic address on concil-
iation with America introduced his resolutions on recon-
ciliatlon March 22, 1775. Like Chatham, Burke thought in 
terms of a return to pre-1763 conditions, the beginning in 
34Albert Smyth, editor, The Writings of Benjamin 
Franklin (New York, 1906) VI, 318. 
35Parl1amentary History XVII~ 149. 
36Ib1d., XVIIL 167. 
the minds of many of the deterioration in Anglo-American 
relationships. He also asked for a repeal of the acts to 
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which the colonists objected, and granting to the colonies 
of the rights of taxation. His resolutions were defeated in 
Commons, 270-78.37 
While Burke and Chatham attempted to bring about con-
ciliation or at least present its values in Parliament, 
there was also intrigue behind the scenes in the winter of 
1774-1775. It involved Franklin and individuals who proba-
bly represented the North Ministry. There is every indica-
tion that Quaker merchant David Barclay, the mysterious 
Dr. John Fothergill, Admiral Lord Richard Howe and Lord 
Howe's sister were acting with the knowledge, if not at the 
direction of members of the Cabinet. At the very least 
these people reflected the thinking and the hopes of an 
influential segment of British society which sincerely 
sought accommodation with America. 
The tale as recounted by Franklin began with a visit 
from Barclay in early December, 1774, and a suggestion that 
Franklin prepare a list, outlining the terms of a settlement 
which would satisfy the American colonists.38 Barclay told 
Franklin his suggestions would be passed on to his friend, 
37 Ibid., XVIII,215. 
38smyth, The Writings of Ben.Jamin Franklin, V~ 341. 
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Dr. Fothergill, who was in daily contact with the American 
Secretary, Lord Dartmouth.39 Franklin protested he had no 
authority to speak for the Continental Congress, and could 
only make suggestions such as appeared to him would assist 
in bringing about an accommodation. After further prodding 
from Barclay, Franklin produced a list of "HINTS FOR CONVER-
SATION upon the Subject of Terms that mlght probably produce 
a durable Union between Britain and the Colonies. 1140 
Franklin's hints included suggestions that the tea 
destroyed in Massachusetts might be paid for if Parliament 
would repeal the Massachusetts Bay Regulating Act, the 
Quebec Act and refrain from altering charters, constitutions 
or laws of any colony. Franklin proposed Britain grant the 
right of free trade to the colonies in exchange for perma-
nent grants of money from the colonies. Or if Britain 
yielded the right of taxation, it could exercise full regu-
lation of colonial trade. Finally, Franklin suggested 
Parliament should repeal some act of legislation seen as 
oppressive by the colonies as an expression of its sin-
cerity. Franklin thought a good choice might be the Declar-
atory Act, asserting Parliamentary supremacy over the colo-
nies. 41 
39Ibid., p. 327. 
40 Ibid., p. 328. 
41Ib1d., pp. 328,329,330. 
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Later Franklin learned that Lord Dartmouth was in 
agreement with some of his proposals and had rejected 
others. The intricate negotiations continued through Jan-
uary and February, 1775 with Barclay and Fothergill relaying 
modifications between Franklin and Dartmouth. 42 The end of 
the negotiations came February 20, 1775 after Lord North's 
conciliatory proposals were introduced in Parliament. 
Franklin was invited to wait on Lord Hyde, an associate of 
the American Secretary, Dartmouth. Hyde indicated that 
Franklin's hints fell short of what the North Ministry ex-
pected and Hyde apparently believed Franklin had powers or 
instructions from Congress for terms more favorable to 
England's viewpoint. Subsequently, the intermediaries, 
Barclay and Fothergill, urged Franklin to stand by his hints 
as a basis for accommodation. 43 
This interlude paralleled in time Franklin's chess 
• 
games with the sister of Lord Richard Howe. The invitation 
to meet the lady for chess came the same day as Franklin's 
first contact with Barclay and Fothergill about terms. 
The first visit on De.cember 4, 1774 led to subsequent 
chess invitations to Franklin, and a meeting between 
Franklin and Lord Howe on December 25, 1775. Howe asked 
Franklin for a list of the terms that would satisfy the 
42Ibid., p. 359. 
43Ibid., p. 393. 
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colonists and resolve the dispute between Great Britain and 
America. He also revealed he had a copy of the "hints" 
Franklin had given David Barclay. According to Franklin's 
recollection, the conversation included the suggestion 
" • • that he [Lord Howe] should not think of influencing 
me by any selfish motive, but certainly I might with reason 
expect any Rewards in the Power of Government to bestow1144 
should a mutually satisfactory formula result from his 
(Franklin's) proposals. 
Lord Howe's connections with the Ministry found 
Franklin's proposals for colonial reconciliation no more 
palatable than did Barclay's. Lord Howe's final bid was an 
offer to make Franklin the secretary of a Peace Commission 
to America. Franklin declined, saying he could not under-
take such an assignment without full knowledge and concur-
rence with the terms under which the Peace Commission was 
to proceed. 45 
The significant aspect of both the Barclay-Fothergill 
intrigue, and Lord Howe's efforts to sway Franklin's views 
on reconciliation between Britain and America was that they 
took place. They were further indications that Americans 
and Englishmen still thought of themselves as a single 
44Ibid., p. 353. 
45Ibid., p. 385 . 
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nation. They demonstrated that among the British leadership 
there were still forces seeking the means to keep the two 
peoples under a common allegiance. 
Franklin, however, found much in England that encour-
aged him to look in a new direction. Writing to Joseph 
Galloway shortly before his departure for America in March, 
1775, he noted, 
• • • • I cannot apprehend more Mischief than Bene-
fit from a closer Union. I fear they will drag us 
after them in all the plundering Wars, which their 
desperate Circumstances, Injustice and Rapacity may 
prompt them to undertake; and their wide-wasting 
Prodigality and Profusion is a Gulph that will swal-
low up every Aid we may distress ourselves to afford 
them. Here Numberless and Needless Places, enormous 
salaries, Pensions, Perquisites, Bribes, groundless 
quarrels, foolish expeditions, false accounts or no 
Accounts, Contracts and Jobs devour all Revenue, and 
produce continual necessity .•.• I apprehend that 
to unite us intimately will only be to corrupt and 
poison us also.46 
Lord North's conciliatory proposals of February 20, 
1775--even if thus labeled--represented no genuine desire 
for accommodation. The terms of the· proposal were a simple 
restatement of Ministerial policy. The colonies were to tax 
themselves for imperial revenues so long as Parliament 
approved of the amount collected and the colonies remitted 
this to England. Meanwhile, Parliament reserved to itself 
the right to regulate colonial commerce through taxation. 
fl 
. . • it will have been just, it will have been humane, 
that we held out the terms of peace," North said before 
46 Ibid., p. 312. 
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Commons. "If they reject it, their blood must be upon their 
own hearts. But I have better hopes: there are people, and 
I hope whole colonies, that wish for peace; and by these 
means, I hope they will find their way to it. 1147 
Others were less generous and North's proposals were 
immediately attacked by the pro-American elements in Parlia-
ment. Later evaluators have been equally harsh. "It was 
not even a halfway measure for peace; it was a stupid ges-
ture," is one historian's evaluation. 48 The dissenting 
views expressed in Parliament reached colonial newspapers in 
America quickly and were widely reproduced. Meanwhile, 
events outran North's proposal. By the time word had 
reached America, first blood had been shed at Lexington and 
Concord. Neither the Americans nor the Ministry were now in 
a mood to consider seriously steps toward reconciliation. 
Yet Americans held back from the act of separation as well. 
There was still another effort in Congress to make an 
appeal to the people of Great Britain. In colonial eyes, 
Lexington, Concord and Bunker Hill had demonstrated the 
mettle of colonial troops and the vast consequences to 
Great Gritain of suppressing American grievances by force. 
The Continental Congress on July 8, 1775 approved a second 
47Parliamentary History, XVIII; 322. 
48 Weldon A. Brownj Em~ire or Independence (Port 
Washington, N.Y., [1941 19 6) p. 45. 
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petition to the King seeking reconciliation. It was largely 
written by Pennsylvania's John Dickinson. The so-called 
Olive Branch petition appealed for a compact between King 
and colonies defining the rights of each. It proposed as a 
basis for agreement that if Great Britain would surrender on 
the taxation issue, the colonies would agree to Britain's 
right to regulate their trade; or, for the right of free 
trade, the colonies proposed to raise their appropriate 
share of Empire revenues. These were in essence the same 
terms which Franklin had transmitted to the North Ministry 
through BarclRy and Fothergill earlier in 1775. 49 
Richard Penn was prevailed upon to deliver the peti-
tion. He presented it on August 21st to Lord Dartmouth, 
who declined to accept it until September 1st. On August 
25, 1775, the American colonies were declared by King 
George III to be in a state of rebellion. The petition was 
summarily rejected by Commons on November 10th.50 Though 
the results of the Olive Branch petition were nil, it demon-
strated again that some Americans still believed reconcilia-
tion was attainable despite the stresses of 1775. And the 
forms and methods followed remained within the framework of 
what colonists perceived as the English constitution. 
49syrett, American Historical Documents, p. 78. 
50Bargar, Lord Dartmouth and the American Revolution, 
P~ 159. 
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The Howe Commission of 1776 was another attempt to 
bring about reconciliation. The brothers Howe, Sir William, 
commander-in-chief of British Armies in America, and Lord 
Richard, commander-in-chief of British Naval forces in 
America, were also authorized to restore the peace. Under 
instructions concurred in by the North Ministry, the Howes 
could pardon individuals and groups for treason, and after a 
colony, town, port, district or place had renewed its alle-
glance to the king, it could once more enter into trade.51 
To recover full legal status; however, all provincial con-
gresses, committees, conventions and associations had to be 
dissolved and the King's officials allowed to return to 
authority. Colonial armies were required to disband. All 
forts and military bases were to be restored to British con-
tro1.52 
After these preliminary steps were taken, the peace 
commissioners were directed to order elections for a new 
legislature. The next requirement would be repayment to 
Loyalists for lost or damaged property. Once this was out 
of the way discussions could commence on the annual contri-
bution each colony would thereafter make to the British 
exchequer. Each colony was to be permitted to raise its 
51Brown, Empire or Independence, p. 82. 
52 Ibid • , p . 8 3 • 
contribution in any way it chose--except taxes on British-
colonial trade were excluded. In addition, the Commis-
sioners were told to pursue reforms in the colonial charters 
along the lines of those established for Massachusetts by 
the Massachusetts Bay Regulating Act. These were a 
strengthened Governor's council appointed by the King; 
judges commissioned in the same manner as those in England; 
and various other reforms. The Connecticut and Rhode Island 
charters were especially designated as needing revision.53 
The Prohibitory Act authorizing the King's representa-
tives to grant pardons and carry out conciliation was passed 
by Parliament in December, 1775. The detailed instructions 
of the peace commissioners were not completed until May 6, 
1776, shortly before Lord Howe sailed for America, May 12th. 
Thus, rumors and reports of the terms brought by the peace 
commissioners had every opportunity to reach America before 
the arrival of Lord Howe. Proponents of independence had 
time in which to act and they did. Howe arrived in America 
in mid-July about two weeks after Congress had decided on 
independence. 
The motives which moved Congress to declare for inde-
pendence in July, 1776, are a question much beyond the scope 
of this discussion. Surface evidence, however, would seem 
53Ibid. 
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to indicate a knowledge by Congress of the Howe Peace Com-
mission and the terms it brought contributed at least to the 
timing of the Declaration. Some members of Congress sought 
to delay a decision on independence until the reconciliation 
which was to be offered by Lord Howe was explored. In the 
end Congress took the step toward independence before Howe 
reached America.54 
Through proclamations and communications directed to 
Congress Lord Howe made known the terms of his Peace Commis-
sion. The letters to Congress were never formally accepted 
since Howe could not address that body directly. Nonethe-
less, a Committee reviewed and rejected the Howe terms.55 
General John Sullivan, an American captured at the 
Battle of Long Island, and then paroled, brought word to 
Congress of Lord Howe's reported willingness--and authority 
--to redress grievances beyond the published peace terms. 
Howe asked a committee from Congress to confer with him in 
their private capacities. 56 A bitter debate within Congress 
finally produced a decision to send Benjamin Franklin, John 
Adams and Edward Rutledge as a Congressional committee--not 
private citizens--to meet with Howe on Staten Island, Sep-
tember 11, 1776. 
54Ibid., p. 105. 
55Ibid., p. 112. 
56 116. Ibid., p. 
After preliminary fencing over whether either Lord 
Howe or the Congressional delegation were acting in their 
official capacities, the group settled down to a discussion 
of conciliation as private persons. Lord Howe suggested as 
a first step toward peace the Americans withdraw the Declar-
ation of Independence. Franklin replied that Lord Howe 
could probably obtain revised instructions from his govern-
ment in London more quickly than the colonists retreat from 
their independence. When Franklin tested whether Howe would 
forward American proposals to London, Howe avoided a direct 
answer. Howe indicated he doubted the propriety of his 
accepting or transmitting them to London.57 
At this point it was obvious that General Sullivan had 
misunderstood or Lord Howe failed to explain his position. 
The Admiral's authority was strictly limited to those terms 
of conciliation with which Congress was already familiar. 
The last face to face meeting between British and American 
representatives seeking conciliation came to a halt. The 
meeting had lasted only about three hours, including a pre-
liminary dinner and the lengthy quarrel over whether the 
negotiators were acting in their official capacities or as 
private individuals. 
The years 1774, 1775 and 1776 had produced dedicated 
efforts by men and goverrunents in both Britain and America 
~ 4 Ibid., p. 12 • 
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aimed at conciliating their differences and discovering an 
accommodation for a continuation of the mutual relationship. 
All of these efforts failed. Inevitably, Lord North and the 
Ministry he headed can be assigned a major share of the 
responsibility for failure. The hard-line policy of coer-
cion initiated in 1774 produced a climate of despair in 
which no efforts at conciliation could thrive. The so-
called conciliatory proposals of 1775 and the Howe Peace 
Commission fell far short of most American expectations. 
Nonetheless, North's coercive measures were supported by 
consistent Parliamentary majorities--some indication that 
his actions were within the framework of British public 
opinion. 
Perhaps the major shortcoming of British policy was 
its duality of purpose. The Parliamentary program of 1774 
was accompanied by the movement of British troops to Massa-
chusetts. Their commander, Sir Thomas Gage, was also 
appointed the royal governor with instructions to implement 
the measures of firmness and reform passed by Parliament. 
Britain became instantly vulnerable to colonial accusations 
that traditional freedoms were being trampled when political 
policies were executed by troop commanders vested with royal 
governorship. 
In addition, the North Ministry failed to support in 
any way the moderate Americans and their proposals. This 
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tended to drive those who supported the Galloway plan or 
other means of conciliation either into the ranks of the 
independence faction or into the arms of the Tories. The 
nucleus of the conciliation faction never had a chance to 
coalesce or expand its membership through a natural process 
encouraged by modest support from London. The summary 
rejection or disregard of petitions from Congress cut the 
ground from under those Americans whose thinking and action 
might have delayed independence while a compromise was being 
sought. 
Thus, those Americans such as Samuel Adams, Thomas 
Paine and others dedicated to breaking the bonds between the 
North American colonies and England were able to portray the 
North Ministry in most conspiratorial hues. The combination 
of military force and hard-line political policy could be 
made to appear as a deliberate effort aimed at reducing the 
colonies to complete subjection. Disregard of petitions 
framed in traditional phrases appealing to English constitu-
tional bulwarks only made the work of these propagandists 
easier. 
Franklin's indirect negotiations with Lord Dartmouth 
could have been the catalyst for formal meetings on a new 
relationship between the colonies and Great Britain. 
Franklin was undoubtedly the most widely known and best 
equipped American in England to represent the colonial view-
41 
point. However, the Hutchinson letters incident, in which 
letters from the Royal governor of Massachusetts to friends 
in England fell into Franklin's hands and were subsequently 
published in America, gravely weakened Franklin's position. 
He was "vilified" by the Solicitor General Alexander 
Wedderburn in a hearing before the Privy Council on January 
29, 1774.58 Under these circumstances it was impossible for 
the North Ministry to pursue reconciliation openly through 
Franklin, and provides at least a Pl:l.rtiRl explanation for 
the discree~ use of intermediaries such as Barclay, Fother-
gill and Lord Howe's sister in the winter of 1774-1775. 
By the spring of 1775 there was little time .or room 
left for political maneuver. The majorities which defeated 
both Chatham's and Burke's moves for conciliation indicated 
a solid base of Parliamentary support for North's policies. 
Once conflict began in Massachusetts at Lexington and 
Concord conciliation became increasingly difficult. The 
early battles convinced colonists of their ability to with-
stand at least the military threat aimed at them. A major 
battle, Bunker Hill, was fought and an invasion of Canada 
launched, and still Congress held back from the final step 
of independence. This underlines again the point that a 
faction of Congress representing a segment of colonial 
opinion still held hopes for conciliation. 
S8M1chael G. Kammen, A Rope of Sand (New York, 1974) 
p. 285. 
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The Howe Commission with its overtones of duplicity--
again a combination of political and military purposes--
repeated the errors of Gage in Massachusetts. Those 
dedicated to independence found an easy target in attacking 
British motives in sending a military commander as a peace 
commissioner, and whose only terms were pardons to those who 
submitted to their previous allegiance. These failures in 
combination with all of the profound misunderstandings of 
America held by British officialdom and coupled with 
American mistrust of the distant bureaucracy in London made 
accommodation a fruitless search in 1774, 1775 and 1776. 
CHAPTER III 
THE CARLISLE COMMISSION AND 
RECONCILIATION 
Early December, 1777 brought the North Ministry face 
to face with a major military disaster in North America. 
The American Secretary, Lord Germain, admitted in Commons on 
December 3rd that disturbing reports of a battle at Saratoga 
in the province of New York had reached him. 1 The Canada 
Expedition under the command of Sir John Burgoyne had met a 
serious setback. Indeed, if the preliminary reports were 
confirmed, it appeared the combined force of British and 
German troops as well as Indian irregulars had been sur-
rounded by colonial regulars and militia, and had surren-
dered. The reports were confirmed. An English-German army 
of 8,000 was lost. The attempt to split New England from 
the other rebellious North American colonies had ended in 
total failure. 
As this gloomy news enveloped Parliament, it became 
increasingly clear that with American military success, 
French support of the colonists might quickly expand beyond 
the hitherto somewhat furtive supplies of credit and 
1Parl1amenta!'Y History, XIX, 322. 
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materiel. Rumors circulated in London of the pending French 
recognition of American independence. A full alliance be-
tween the North American rebels and France was viewed in 
England as an increasing likelihood which might lead England 
into a new war with France. 
In the few days between the arrival of the news of 
Burgoyne's debacle and the scheduled annual Christmas re-
cess, Lord North's foes in Parliament pursued both issues. 
David Hartley, Member from Hull, proposed an immediate ces-
sation of the North American hostilities in order to seek a 
reconciliation with the colonists. To reach this end it 
would be necessary, Hartley said, 
• • • to bestow upon the colonies an entire freedom 
of legislative powers within themselves; hoping 
thereby to lay a foundation for a perpetual and in-
dissoluable bond of affection and alliance in every 
respect as beneficial to both countries •••• "2 
Hartley's proposals were defeated without a division. 
Before Parliament recessed, however, North's foes re-
sumed their attack. The Opposition renewed its demands for 
an inquiry into the events which culminated with Burgoyne's 
surrender, the status of Franco-British relations, and com-
bined these efforts into a motion calling for Parliament to 
meet the growing crisis by remaining in session and fore-
going its customary Christmas recess.3 Despite warnings of 
2Ibid., p. 560. 
3 Ibid., p • 591 • 
45 
the pending Franco-American alliance, Lord North presented 
an undisturbed countenance to Commons. As early as November 
20, 1776, Lord Stormont, British Minister to Paris, had 
reported to Lord Weymouth, 
I am very secretly and, I am afraid, authentically 
informed that a treaty or convention is not only 
agreed upon, but is actually drawn out article by 
article, libelle et paragraphe, were the words my 
informer used.4 
Nonetheless, Lord North reassured Commons on December 
10th in the debate over the adjournment, "The Campaign is 
already terminated. France did not molest us; nor did he 
believe either France or Spain had the least intention to 
1 ,,5 mo est us • • • • The effort to bring Parliament back 
into session in seven days rather than the customary six 
week adjournment was initiated by Burke. His motion failed, 
155 to 68, but not before North had promised to present to 
Parliament after the Christmas recess conciliatory pro-
posals aimed at restoring peace in the North American colo-
nies. A similar motion to remain in session over the 
Christmas holidays of 1777 was also defeated in the House of 
Lords.6 
4 B. F. Stevens, Facsimilies of ManuscriBts in 
pean Archives Relating to America, 1775 to 17 3 (25 
London, 1889-1895), XIV, 1375. 
5Parllamentary History, XIX, 591. 
6Ibid. 
Euro-
v~, 
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Parliament's recess did not deter one of its members, 
William Eden, from his work on a plan of reconciliation with 
America. Since Eden was a confidante of North, it is more 
than likely his efforts were guided to some extent by North. 
With its customary circumspection, Eden and the British Min-
istry began to try to sound out the American Commissioners 
in Paris on their views of acceptable conciliation terms. 
Agents of the North Ministry (including Paul Wentworth who 
represented Eden) made a series of approaches to both Frank-
lin, now American Commissioner to the Court of Louis XVI at 
Versailles, and his fellow commissioner, Silas Deane, the 
Connecticut merchant. But by December 16, 1777, Franklin 
had been informed by a representative of Comte Vergennes~ 
the French Foreign Minister, that·France was ready to recog-
nize American independence, and to enter into a treaty of 
friendship and commerce with the new nation.7 
Franklin had suddenly become the focus of both British 
and French diplomacy. It is difficult to determine exactly 
all the North agents who contacted Franklin personally, 
through intermediaries, or through correspondence. It would 
appear from the references in Franklin's writings that the 
main approaches were made by James Hutton, the elderly 
leader of the Moravian religious sect in Europe and America; 
7Edward E. Hale and Edward E. Hale, Jr., Franklin in 
France (2 vols., New York, 1969, 1887), I, 176. 
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David Hartley, member of Parliament and persistent advocate 
of conciliation; William Johnstone Pulteney, member of Par-
liament from Shrewsbury; a Mr. Chapman, member of the Irish 
Parliament; Benjamin Vaughan, an associate of Lord Shel-
burne; and the mysterious Charles de Weissensteln. 
In addition, the correspondence between King George 
III and Lord North identifies Paul Wentworth, a British 
agent on the Continent, as another North emissary who sought 
to learn American conciliation terms from Franklin in the 
December-January, 1777-78 Parliamentary recess. The King 
wrote to Lord North on January 13, 1778: 
I have read the very voluminous and undigested 
letters from Mr. Wentworth •••• It also appears 
from these letters that Franklin and Deane either 
have no power of treating or that they are not 
inclined to furnish any lights how an accommoda-
tion can be effected, for whilst nothing short of 
Independency will be accepted, I do not think there 
is a Man either bold or Mad enough to presume to 
treat for the Mother Country on such a basis; per-
haps the time may come when it will be wise to 
abandon all North America but Canada, Nova Scotia 
and the Floridas, but then the generality of the 
Nation must see it first in that light; but to 
treat with Independence can never be possible.8 
Who were the authorized and genuine representatives of 
the North Ministry? Who were agents or double agents? Who 
acted out of compassion or goodwill generated by only their 
own dedication to restoring peace and harmony within the 
British Empire? It is difficult to sort the authentic agents 
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of government from the frauds. But with the French commit-
ment of December 16, 1777 to American independence and an 
alliance, Franklin made the French connection his basic 
position. He responded to all approaches with essentially 
the same terms--immediate American independence or the with-
drawal of British forces from North America--was the neces-
sary first step to any discussion of conciliation. 
Those who appear to have been accredited representa-
tives of North (in addition to Wentworth) were most likely 
William Pulteney and David Hartley. Their contacts with 
Franklin may well have contributed to the conciliatory pro-
posals made to Parliament by Lord North, February 19, 1778. 
The greatest contribution to this plan, however, came frQm 
North's aide, Eden. During December, 1777 and January, 1778 
he had been busily preparing the peace proposal for North's 
consideration. In the process he corresponded with a number 
of members of Parliament, and had the aid of Solicitor-
General Alexander Wedderburn in drafting his measure.9 
"A pacific proposition," North wrote to the King on 
January 29, 1778, 
appears to him (Lord North] necessary both for this 
country and America; Ld. North's declaration requires 
it; at the same time it may be very disgustful to 
the present zealous friends of government. If a 
proposal is made it must be a considerable and ex-
plicit one and such as bids fair to have some effect 
9stevens, Facsimilies of Manuscripts in Euro ean 
Archives Relating to America, 1775 to 1783, IV, 34~,348. 
in the Colonies. But what will do there may offend 
and fail here •••• 10 
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It is almost certain that before North made public his 
proposals in Parliament on February 19, 1778, he was fully 
aware that the Franco-American Alliance had become fact. 
Wentworth in Paris confirmed that the treaty had been 
signed. 11 Lord Camden told the House of Lords on February 
16, 1778 he had seen correspondence from Franklin that 
North's still pending proposals were too late. He added 
that the Franco-American Alliance had already been signed 
in Paris.12 
In the face of certain knowledge that American inde-
pendence had been recognized by England's traditional 
enemy, Lord North continued his conciliation plans. In gen-
eral terms, he proposed "to repeal the Tea Duty, to repeal 
the Massachusetts Charter Bill, and to give, by an Act of 
Parliament, ample promises to the Commissioners to settle 
every other point. 1113 This included renunciation by Parlia-
ment of its right to tax Americans, and the appointment of 
Commissioners to treat with Congress, colonies or indivi-
duals on further grievances in bringing about reconciliation. 
lOcorrespondence of King George III, rv, 28. 
11 Ibid., p. 36. 
12 Parliamentary History, XIX, 741. 
13 Correspondence of King George III, IV, 28. 
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The American sine qua non had been achieved with the 
signing of the French treaty thereby recognizing American 
independence February 6, 1778.14 But Vergennes insisted on 
maintaining secrecy on the treaty while he made his final 
efforts to bring Spain in also as a signatory to the 
American treaties. Thus, Franklin continued to play the 
role of the reluctant colonial determined upon independence 
as a preliminary to any accommodation. 
Some have argued that North's conciliatory measures 
were designed chiefly to block or delay the Franco-American 
rapprochement. North was aware the agreement between France 
and America had been formalized before he presented his 
plans to Parliament. Even after the French officially noti-
fied England of their recognition·of America on March 1, 
1778, North continued his efforts at conciliation.15 Dis-
cussions about conciliation with other Ministers and its 
review with the King indicate it was not considered some 
minor diplomatic ploy. 
Likewise the sincerity of Franklin in conciliation 
negotiations in the spring of 1778 has been questioned. Did 
he encourage the English approaches to maintain a delicate 
pressure upon the French during a critical period of the 
14 Samuel F. Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American 
1' Revolution (Bloomington, Indiana, ~1957J 1935) p. 61. 
15 Correspondence of King George III, IV, 77. 
. 
. 
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treaty negotiations with France? That same pressure after 
the treaty signing could also have been the means to assure 
that the French would observe their treaty obligations. It 
is worth noting that Franklin consistently sought from Great 
Britain only that which France had already granted--recogni-
tion of American independence. There seems every indication 
that Franklin's actions were steadfastly directed toward 
American independence. 
Writing to Hartley on February 26, 1778, Franklin re-
peated the essential ingredients of the accommodation the 
North Ministry was seeking, that is, independence or the 
withdrawal of British forces in North America. He added, 
Seriously, on further thoughts, I am of the opinion 
that, if wise and honest men, such as Sir George 
Savile, the Bishop of Asaph~ and yourself were to come 
over here immediately with powers to treat, you might 
not only obtain peace with America, but prevent a war 
with France.16 
Lord North's proposal for an American Peace Commission 
received the same critical scrutiny in Parliament it would 
undergo at a later date in America. Rumors of the Franco-
American treaty continued, but were still denied officially 
by the Ministry in Parliament. The strongest arguments in 
support of the conciliation measures were those which 
repeated the truisms of the Anglo-American relationships in 
which many members of Parliament still believed. "To Great 
16smyth, The Writings of Benjamin Franklin, VII, 109. 
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Britain they (the colonies] are united by religion, govern-
ment, laws, language, habits, affection and relation," Sir 
Grey Cooper, a North supporter and advocate of the plan, 
told the House of Commons on March 2, 1778 during the debate 
on the conciliation question. 17 
Lord Shelburne opposed the North plan as falling short 
of what the colonies would demand. Still, he warned, the 
shock of separation to Great Britain would be drastic. He 
voiced the commonly held belief that, " •• • the sun of 
Great Britain is set, and we shall no longer be a powerful 
or respectable people, the moment the independency of 
America is agreed to by our government. 1118 
Another viewpoint was that of John Wilkes, the contro-
versial radical member of Commons·representing a London 
district. "The.Conciliatory bills," he declared in Com-
mons, "are in my opinion more calculated for this country 
than America. They appear only meant to keep the minds of 
the people quiet here •••• 1119 
The Earl of Abingdon's protest against the American 
Conciliatory Bills pointed out some of the major deficien-
cies. in North's proposals. First, that Parliament in re-
nouncing taxation of the colonies could provide no guarantee 
17Parliamentary History, XIX, 791. 
18Ibid., p. 850. 
19Ibid., p. 806. 
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that a future Parliament might not reinstate that taxation. 
Second, how could Parliament suspend a right that many mem-
bers as well as Americans argued was not possessed by Par-
liament in the first instance? Third, Congress would be 
compelled to negotiate with the English peace commissioners 
without knowing what would be ultimately accepted by Parlia-
ment. 20 
Approval by Parliament of Lord North's American Peace 
Commission did not deter either North's official agents or 
those who thought they acted on England's behalf from pur-
suing matters with Franklin. Franklin summed up his view 
of the North plan in a letter to Gerard Rayneval in the 
French Foreign Ministry. 
He will show you the Propositions. They would prob-
ably have been accepted, if they had been made two 
years ago. I have answered they come too late; And 
that every Kind of Acknowledgement of the Government 
of Great Britain, how small soever, is now become 
impracticable.21 
The long-rumored Franco-American treaty was finally 
confirmed by Lord North in Commons on March 17, 1778. Con-
ciliation with America now gained a new force generated by 
the fear of war with France. Writing to the King, March 
25th, North pointed out, 
••• although the offence received from France is 
great He [Lord North) owns that he should be glad if 
an accommodation with America would prevent for the 
20Ib1d., p. 867. 
21
smyth, The Writings of Benjamin Franklin, VII, 128. 
present moment a war with France, as he thinks that 
Great Britain will suffer more ln the war, than her 
enemies, He does not mean, by defeats, but by an 
enormous expense, which will ruin her, and will not 
in any degree be repaid by the most brilliant vic-
tories. 22 
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It was under these circumstances that William Pulteney 
was dispatched to Paris on March 29, 1778 to meet with 
Franklin and seek his agreement to the North plan of con-
ciliation. Franklin merely repeated to Pulteney that the 
propositions of 1778 were two years too late. Independence 
or the withdrawal of British forces in North America 
remained the rock bottom conditions for negotiation. 
Pulteney's own analysis of his mission and the pros-
pects for reconciliation appeared in a pamphlet published 
later in 1778 under the title, Thoughts on the Present State 
of Affairs with America and the Means of Conciliation. 
Pulteney reviewed the American question from its emergenc~ 
as a dispute over taxation, and concluded 
••• the Americans had no option but either to sub-
mit as a conquered people ..• or to declare them-
selves independent, in order to establish some 
regular form of government amongst themselves, and 
to entitle them to treat for assistance with other 
powers.23 
To resolve England's dilemma, Pulteney leaned heavily 
on Lord North's proposals with some additional concessions. 
22 Fortescue, Correspondence of King George III, IV, 
77. 
23William Pulteney, Thoughts on the Present State of 
Affairs with America and the Means of_Conc~liation (London, 
1778), p. 41. 
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He would have eliminated permanently any question of current 
or future British taxation in the American colonies, and 
made voluntary all American contributions to Empire adminis-
tration. All colonial charters would have been restored and 
remained unchanged except by petition from the colonists. 
Pulteney also went beyond North's plan by urging the repeal 
of the Q~ebec Act, and promising the establishment in Canada 
of a form of government modeled on the British constitution. 
Pulteney was frankly fearful of the long-range results of 
the Franco-American alliance, the ultimate military and 
economic strength of an independent America, and especially 
the role it might play in international relations as a 
protege of France. 24 
"The two countries (England and America]," he 
pleaded, 
are peculiarly fitted to contribute to each others 
prosperity; and if anything is likely to prolong, to 
ages too remote for probable conjecture, the freedom 
and prosperity of this Kingdom, I conceive it would 
be, the connection which may now be formed, with 
British America.25 
Perhaps the strangest of all the agents who sought to 
contact Franklin in Paris for the purpose of reconciliation 
was Charles de Weissenstein. His letter to Franklin was 
purportedly posted from Brussels, June 16, 1778 and delivered 
surreptiously. The basis for the secret negotiations which 
24Ibid., 45 54 55 . PP· , , • . 
25Ibid., p. 54. 
56 
de Weissenstein proposed were essentially Lord North's pro-
positions. Once terms had been agreed upon, de Weissenstein 
suggested they could be confirmed by an Act of Parliament. 
There was no doubt in Franklin's mind that the 
de Weissenstein initiative originated either with King 
George III or with one of his Ministers. The clearest evi-
dence of this origin is that portion of the de Weissenstein 
letter which suggested, 
• • • the following persons shall have offices, or pen-
sions for life, at their option, according to the sums 
opposite their respective names: --
Messers. Adams, 
Hancock, 
Washington, 
Franklin, 
&c, &c, &c 
In case his Majesty or his successors shall ever 
create American peers, then these persons, or their 
descendants, shall be amongst the first so created, if 
they choose it. Mr. Washington to have immediately a 
brevet of Lieutenant General~ and all the honors and 
precedences thereto •••• 2° 
Franklin was directed to send his response by messen-
ger to Notre Dame at an appointed day and time. The mes-
senger was to wait for the drop of a crumpled paper to the 
floor of the Cathedral to signal his readiness to receive 
the response. Franklin's answer, flatly rejecting the pro-
positions and the mode of negotiation, was prepared but 
probably never delivered since the de Weissenstein letter 
26Hale and Hale, Jr., Franklin in France, I, 239. 
57 
and the response were found together in the French archives. 
According to Edward Hale in Franklin in France, 
On the day and hour appointed at Notre Dame, an 
Irishman named "Col. Fitzsomething" appeared at the 
place appointed and remained for two hours tracked 
all the time by police, who had been directed by 
Vergennes to keep an eye upon him.27 
Meanwhile in London the North Administration slowly 
gathered the individuals who were to make up the American 
Peace Commission. As its head, the King appointed Frederick 
Howard, Earl of Carlisle, whose name would forever be asso-
elated with the reconciliation efforts. Carlisle had a 
reputation as an ambitious but ineffective politician with a 
flair for high living. Eden, architect of the Peace Comis-
sion and close to Lord North, was also selected. Although 
Carlisle was the Commission's chief, Ede~ virtually directed 
affairs because of his association with North. Sir Henry 
Clinton, commander-in-chief of British Forces in America, 
was also appointed to the Commission, but remained entirely 
inactive so far as its peace-making activities were con-
cerned. The fourth commissioner named was Richard Jackson, 
member of Parliament from New Romney. When Jackson 
expressed reluctance over participating, and indicated he 
favored an immediate grant of independence for America, he 
was quietly dropped. He was replaced by Commodore George 
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Johnstone, also a member of Parliament and a one-time Gov-
ernor of Georgia. 
Instructions to the Commissioners for achieving recon-
ciliation were detailed and voluminous. In addition to the 
concessions already made by Parliament in suspending or 
repealing existing acts, the Commissioners were authorized 
to promise: 
The claim of independence to be admitted during the 
time of the treaty and for the purpose of the treaty. 
British protection of American commerce as soon as 
peace was established. 
No taxation of the colonies by Parliament. 
Voluntary contributions for Empire administration and 
defense. 
No standing army in America in peace time if provin-
cial forces were organized. 
No alteration of colonial charters except by colonial 
consent. 
Popular election of Governors with the King's approval. 
Election of delegates to Congress under the Articles 
of Confederation to continue, but no infringement of the 
sovereignity of Great Britain. 
Unqualified pardon of all persons. 
Admiralty Courts to be restrained in their operation. 
If repeal of the Declaratory Act was proposed, a 
declaration on the respective rights of Great Britain 
and America should be framed upon the close of the whole 
treaty. 
Abolition or quitrents and claims ror arrears. 
Loyalist property must be restored to its owners. 
Colonial obligations prior to August, 1775 must be 
paid. 
England would not redeem colonial paper money nor 
accept responsibility for debts incurred by the colo-
·nies in the course of the rebellion.28 
No renunciation of the Declaration of Independence was 
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spelled out as had been the case in the conciliation plan of 
1776. However, it was expected that there was to be a tacit 
American acceptance of this when agreement had been reached 
on all the remaining terms of peace. 
Certainly the North Administration had moved a great 
distance from its position at the time of the Howe Peace 
Commission of 1776. Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga and 
the possibility of French intervention had placed colonial 
problems in a vastly different perspective. Taxation of the 
colonies was forthrightly abandoned in favor of a voluntary 
plan. Legislative supremacy was no longer the exclusive 
prer..ogative of Parliament, but to be shared in somewhat 
undefined terms with Congress and the colonies if one pre-
sumes Parliament would have ratified the extreme limits of 
the Carlisle Commission's instructions. While the question 
of American representation in Parliament was raised in the 
instructions, the Commissioners were directed to refer pro-
posals on this matter to the Ministry before taking any 
steps to confer this privilege on Americans. In all, the 
28Eric Robson, The American Revolution in its Polit-
ical and Military Aspects (New York, 1966) p. 197; Brown, 
Empire or Independence, pp. 250-251. 
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Commissioners carried an attractive package of peace pro-
posals that went far toward recognizing Congress as an inde-
pendent power at least for the purposes of negotiating a 
treaty and re-establishing the peace. It was responsive to 
what had been the chief colonial grievances prior to 1776. 
It was intended that the basis of any treaty rest on restor-
ing conditions as they existed in 1763, now seen as a happy 
era that had ended the Anglo-French rivalry in North America 
and before the recent colonial quarrels had arisen. 
Great Britain was offering to America what later gen-
erations would refer to as virtual dominion status. In the 
opinion of William Knox, a key figure at the Board of Trade 
where he served so long, 
. • • if the colonies had accepted the offers the 
Commissioners were impowered to make, the people 
then would have had all the advantages of British 
subjects without any share of the burdens of 
Empire •••• 29 
When the proposals reached America on April 14, 1778 
well ahead of the Commissioners, they were forwarded to 
General Washington by Royal Governor Tryon of New York. 
Washington passed them on to Congress with a suggestion they 
be given wide distribution so long as Congress added its 
appropriate comments on the proposals. Washington logically 
suspected some major diplomatic event in Europe had brought 
about the new British conc111at1on proposals. Congress 
29Ibid., p. 197, as quoted by Robson. 
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agreed with Washington'a analysis, and on April 22, 1778 
voted to reject the North conciliation plan as insincere and 
divisive. 30 It refused to enter into any negotiations until 
England either acknowledged American independence or with-
drew its forces from the colonies. Meanwhile, Congress 
urged publication of the proposals along with its comments 
in colonial newspapers. The Congressional comment virtually 
paralleled that already made in Parliament as the concilia-
tion proposals were debated. 
Whether Congress had acted wisely in an immediate 
refusal to consider Great Britain's offer to retreat from 
its long-held positions on many imperial questions and to 
negotiate a new relationship was discussed by the general 
public only briefly. On May 2, 1778 Silas Deane reached 
York, Pennsylvania, the temporary seat of Congress, bearing 
the French treaties recognizing American independence. The 
treaties were swiftly ratified by a hastily reassembled 
Congress. 
Thus, when the American Peace Commissioners reached 
Philadelphia on June 6, 1778 nearly all likelihood that 
their mission might enjoy any success had already been 
destroyed. They found Americans buoyed not only by the 
military success of Saratoga, but reassured in the new-found 
30Journals of the Continental Congress (39 vols., 
Washington, D.C., 1908), X, 380. 
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security of the Franco-American Alliance. To the further 
dismay of the Commissioners, on their arrival in Philadel-
phia they discovered the British forces about to evacuate 
the colonial capitol, and under orders to detach a large 
part of the existing British forces in North America for an 
expedition to the French West Indies.31 Events, unfavorable 
at the outset for England, had continued to run against the 
cause of conciliation. 
The Commissioners wrote to the President of Congress 
on June 9th, declaring their authority to negotiate peace 
terms and outlining the basis upon which their instructions 
rested for reaching a peaceful settlement of Anglo-American 
differences. The Congressional response on June 17, 1778 
was a reiteration of the earlier decision on April 23rd: 
acknowledgement of American independence or withdrawal of 
British forces were pre-conditions before any negotiations 
could be considered.32 Commodore Johnstone, one of the 
Peace Commissioners, thereupon launched a personal campaign 
of letter writing to colonial leaders. The letters promised 
high honors and rewards to those who would help in bringing 
about conciliation. The recipients generally interpreted 
Commodore Johnstone's letters as clumsy attempts at bribery. 
31 . 
Robson, The American Revolution in its Political 
and Military Aspects, p. 198. · 
32Journals of the Continental Congress, XI, 614. 
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The letters were turned over to Congress and many ultimately 
published.33 
On July 11th the Commissioners wrote again to Con-
gress, which declined to answer a letter inquiring by what 
authority Congress made treaties with foreign powers. The 
Commissioners issued two more despairing manifestos pro-
claiming their peaceful purposes and their desire for recon-
ciliation. The first was published on August 26, 1778 and 
the second on October 3rd. Neither produced even a modicum 
of favorable public or press sentiment toward conciliation.34 
Nor did Congress even feel it necessary to acknowledge the 
proclamations. The discouraged Commissioners set sail for 
England in November, 1778, their mission a complete failure. 
William Eden, one of the Peace Commissioners, reviewed 
the Commission's work in a pamphlet published in 1779. With 
considerable accuracy he identified France as the principal 
cause of his failure in America. "I am ••• ,"he wrote, 
• • • fully satisfied that if France had not thrown 
away the scabbard in the beginning of last year, 
your Lordship (the Earl of Carlisle] would have had 
the honour of announcing to this country the re-
covery of her colonies • .35 
33Robson, The American Revolution in its Political and 
Military Aspects, p. 203. 
34Ib1d., p. 205. 
35william Eden, Four Letters to the Earl of Carlisle 
from William Eden, Esq:-\London, 1779) p. 40. 
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Eden saw the conflict in America not as a colonial 
struggle for independence but rather an imperial rivalry 
over colonies between Great Britain, France and Spain. The 
critical question for Britain's foremost advocate of con-
ciliation was 
••. whether we shall be deprived of our dependen-
cies, be stript of our maritime power, become total 
and immediate bankrupts to all the world and hold a 
crippled trade and commerce hereafter at the good-
will and compassion of the House of Bourbon.36 
Eden also pointed out, "The original object of this war is 
the recovery of our Colonies (and we should never lose sight 
of that object)." He concluded, ". . . but our first pur-
pose at present is to establish our superiority at sea 
against France and Spain."37 
From December, 1777 through the fall of 1778 the ini-
tlative for conciliation had been assumed logically and 
almost solely by Great Britain. She made the concessions, 
she proposed the terms which even her own Parliament might 
have found it difficult to ratify and she undertook to bring 
the Americans to the conference table either in Paris or in 
America. All of her efforts at conciliation failed. Why? 
First, and most obviously, American military strength 
and American diplomacy were in the ascendancy. Lord Jeffrey 
Amherst, victor in America in the French and Indian War, was 
36Ibid., p. 48. 
37Ibid., p. 57. 
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asked for his advice on future British strategy in the dark 
days of December, 1777. He coolly informed the King it 
would require another army of at least 40,000 men to make up 
for the losses at Saratoga and conquer America.38 Such an 
undertaking was beyond the logistic and support capabili-
ties of Great Britain even if the American rebels were her 
only concern, which was not the case. French intervention 
had to be considered a highly probable development; Spain, 
too, might play a role. The Franco-American Alliance only 
worsened an already desperate situation. 
Little wonder Lord North wrote on March 25, 1778 to 
the King in a gloomy forecast: 
Lord North begs leave to trouble his majesty for a 
moment on a disagreeable subject in which he is bound 
to speak truth, the bad situation of affairs will 
with great appearance of reason be attributed to the 
obstinate perseverance in the American War. There is 
therefore no probability that the present Ministers 
can continue many weeks longer . . • • In short, 
peace with America, and a change in the Ministry are 
the only steps which can save this country.39 
The motivation for conciliation and peace were pri-
marily British and hence the initiatives had to come from 
that source. But for whatever reason, the Ministry proved 
incapable of laying out a coherent master plan and following 
it. Its simultaneous multiple policies could only lead--as 
they did--to charges of insincerity and divisiveness. This 
38Fortescue, Correspondence of King George III, IV, 15. 
39Ibid., p. 78. 
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at a time when credibility was an attribute that British 
diplomacy desperately needed. A case in point was the 
multiple efforts of British representatives to bring about 
conciliation negotiations in Paris. Who spoke for the King? 
Paul Wentworth, James Hutton, David Hartley, William 
Pulteney or Charles de Weissenstein? The outward appear-
ances of these efforts were trickery and deceit. 
It might be argued that Franklin encouraged this situ-
ation in order to keep the French responsive to American 
financial and military needs. However, it is difficult to 
believe that if Franklin had perceived a genuine British 
willingness to negotiate on the basis of independence he 
would not have seized it quickly. American success was 
never such a sure thing that a legitimate opportunity could 
be ignored. 
North's conciliatory proposals which evolved into the 
Carlisle Commission could have been--as some have suggested 
--simply a last ditch effort at blocking the Franco-American 
Alliance. The facts to support this viewpoint are almost 
totally absent. If this were the case, then the superb 
British intelligence system failed Lord North miserably. 
The Franco-American Alliance was agreed upon and signed 
before Lord North offered his conciliation plan in Parlia-
ment on February 17, 1778. "Within forty-two hours after 
the signature of the treaties of February 6, 1778, Bancroft 
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40 got copies of them to Whitehall ••• ," and North must 
have been aware of the Franco-American Alliance well before 
his conciliation terms reached Parliament. It is another 
tribute to Dr. Edward Bancroft, secretary to the American 
Commissioners, and known to be one of North's intelligence 
sources in Paris. 
It seems far more logical in the context of North's 
own concerns for the future, his willingness to turn over 
the leadership to Lord Chatham and the gloomy military out-
look seen by Lord Amherst that the conciliation effort was 
genuine. From the British viewpoint it offered an escape 
from the quicksand of an increasingly costly American War 
while faced with a new French threat. 
Within the political and diplomatic ramifications of 
the conciliation of 1778 and the Carlisle Commission can be 
identified some of the critical elements in the great recon-
ciliation effort by Great Britain in 1782. Among them were 
the British perspective of the Anglo-American bonds of lan-
guage, government, culture, religion and shared traditions. 
Another was the unreasoned fear of the economic consequences 
to Great Britain from the loss of its colonies. England's 
growing diplomatic isolation in Europe was still another 
factor. The ferment of domestic political reform contrib-
uted its uncertainty, too. And compounded with these 
40Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution, 
p. 66. 
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elements was the conservative conviction that the system of 
mercantilism which had brought England to its greatest hour 
of triumph in 1763 still remained the touchstone of future 
economic security. Each had helped to shape the failure of 
conciliation in the crisis of 1777-78 and each would play a 
role in the final treaty of peace between America and Great 
Britain. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE LAST CAMPAIGN 
Militarily and more important, diplomatically, the 
year 1778 marked a watershed in the events of the American 
War. With the revelation of the long expected Franco-
American alliance in March, the war which had begun as a 
North American colonial rebellion against imperial re-
straints became international in scope. France openly 
entered the struggle in March, 1778 as an ally of the col-
onies. Spain followed France's lead in April, 1779. Great 
Britain declared war on the Netherlands in December, 1780, 
to end that nation's role as a neutral supplier of the 
rebels. The involvement of the world's foremost colonial 
powers--England, Spain, France and Holland--cast the shadow 
of war across four continents. The hazard of conflict 
existed in Europe, North America and the Caribbean Islands, 
Africa and the Asian sub-continent, India. 
Before 1775 those in England and America who aimed at 
a middle way short of war and separation identified their 
goals and themselves with something they called the English 
constitution. The ties between colonies and Great Britain 
still seemed strong enough to bind together those who shared 
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ancient political traditions, a common language and alle-
giance to the throne of Great Britain. When war came in 
1775 men of goodwill on both sides of the Atlantic still 
pursued the will-o'-the-wisp of reconciliation and reunion 
through direct appeal and negotiation. Now, in 1778, how-
ever, the efforts to end the American conflict moved away 
from the traditional Anglo-American channels into the laby-
rinths of international diplomacy. The war's expansion 
after 1778 entangled the war aims of the North American col-
onies for independence with the international rivalries of 
the European powers. Conciliation no longer was only the 
concern of London and the colonies; it became the interest 
of diplomats in Madrid, Paris, St. Petersburg and Vienna 
as well. 
Spain, an incongruous ally to a colonial rebellion, 
was the origin of the first mediation effort in 1779. The 
Spanish ultimatum to Great Britain, offering its good 
offices to mediate the differences between Great Britain and 
its colonies, as an alternative to Spanish involvement, was 
designed, of course, to produce rejection by the British. 1 
The terms outlined by Spain are worth noting since they re-
mained essentially the basis of all succeeding mediation 
initiatives over the next two years. The proposed founda-
tions for the mediation were de facto recognition of 
1 
p. 83. 
Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution, 
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American independence by Great Britain during the negotia-
tions and a long term truce uti possidet~ or stand still 
cease fire. For its good offices in this mediation, Spain 
would be pleased to accept Fortress Gibraltar from a grate-
ful Britain.2 
Britain's flat refusal to consider such a bargain 
offered Spain the opportunity to declare it had been forced 
into the conflict by Britain's action. The already planned 
French-Spanish Armada against England sailed to its summer 
rendezvous with futility, but not before bringing home to 
Britons the frightening realization of their vulnerability 
in fighting a naval war both in North America and Europe. 
The success of the combined French and Spanish fleets in 
eluding the British fleet off Plymouth as well as the rumors 
of French and Spanish landings in England during the summer 
of 1779, were to have an ultimate impact on the shape of 
English diplomacy.3 
It was Spain again which initiated the possibilities 
of ending the now international war and resolving the 
American problem through mediation in 1780. Spain's reward 
for bringing to a close what more and more appeared that 
year to be a stalemated war in both Europe and America was 
naturally Gibraltar. England, despite its success in 
2 Ibid., p. 84. 
3Morr1s, The Peacemakers, pp. 37-40. 
72 
capturing Charleston, South Carolina, in May, 1780 was 
interested in ending an increasingly heavy drain on its re-
sources and manpower--if it could be done without loss to 
the Empire. It did not contemplate a gift of the stature 
and significance of Gibraltar to Spain or independence for 
America. 
Thus came about the diplomatic mission of Richard 
Cumberlund, playwright and government functionary, and 
Thomas Hussey, Irish priest, to Spain as agents of Lord 
Germain, the American Secretary. Spain's proposal for re-
solving the American war was close to its earlier ultimatum 
to Great Britain. That is, a long-term truce uti possidetis 
accompanied by direct negotiations between England and its 
colonies at the European peace conference. The basis for 
the negotiations as outlined were approximately those of 
the Carlisle Commission proposals or in today's terms, 
dominion status. Britain's outright refusal to consider 
cession of Gibraltar to Spain for equivalents of any sort 
brought the preliminary discussions to a halt. 4 
At the Court of America's first European ally, France, 
there were also efforts at finding peace in 1780. At the 
center of the intrigue was the Director General of Finances, 
Jacques Necker. Necker used his role as the financial head 
4Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution, 
pp. 105-106. 
73 
of the French government to urge Comte Maurepas, the French 
premier, toward a negotiated peace with England, by abandon-
ing his commitments to America in the interest of rescuing 
France from an increasingly desperate financial situation. 
Indirect communication between Necker and North via the 
London banker, Thomas Walpole, continued into October. 
Then, King George III put a finish to further encouragement 
of the incipient negotiations by refusing to participate 
"whilst the House of Bourbon made American independency an 
article of their propositions II 5 
Another Necker intrigue to remove France from the war 
via a truce and some sort of division of America was also in 
operation in other channels during the summer of 1780. The 
English envoy to Sardinia, Viscount Mountstuart, met his one-
time tutor, Paul-Henri Mallet, while vacationing from his 
post in Turin at Geneva. Mallet had been prepared for his 
contact by a series of meetings in Paris with Necker. Al-
though the proposed peace terms were never specified in 
detail by Necker, it was suggested that one province in 
America might be granted its independence while the remain-
der of the colonies returned to their former relationship to 
Great Britain. Mountstuart passed along these and other 
hirits of French desires to end the war to Lord Hillsborough, 
5Morr1s, The Peacemakers, p. 97. 
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the foreign minister, in London. It was the King in Novem-
ber, 1780 who again halted possible peace negotiations with 
a flat refusal to negotiate with France so long as that 
nation aided the former colonies in their rebellion. 6 
These failures did not discourage other European 
nations from pursuing mediation of what was an international 
war inextricably tangled with Anglo-American differences. 
Russia launched its mediation effort in December, 1780 
presenting proposals to the three European belligerents, 
France, England and Spain. In the months that followed each 
of the three nations maneuvered to shape the peace proposal 
to its own ends or to delay action when that was in its 
interest. By May, 1781 the Russian mediation suggestion had 
been re-shaped into a new plan transmitted to the three 
European belligerents. It was now a co-mediation by 
Catherine, Empress of Russia and Joseph, the Emperor of 
Austria. The proposal called for a peace congress in Vienna 
with direct but separate negotiations between England and 
America in the same city. However, the participation of 
Austria and Russia or the belligerents in the Anglo-American 
discussions was only to take place when requested. In addi-
tion, the separate settlement between Great Britain and its 
colonies would not be valid unless it was signed in conjunc-
tion with a peace treaty among the European powers at war. 
6 Ibid., p. 103. 
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Finally, there was to be a general armistice for a year to 
enable the congress to meet in Vienna.7 
The co-mediation collapsed in June, 1781 with Brit-
ain 1 s flat refusal to negotiate with its colonies under the 
auspices of an international peace conference. "The media-
tors were reminded of· the King's 'immutable resolution' not 
to permit any interference by foreign powers with his re-
bellious subjects. 118 The French, stiffened by John Adams' 
refusal to accept any other role at Vienna than that of a 
sovereign, independent nation, likewise declined the co-
mediation. The Spanish were also disinterested--there was 
no stipulation concerning the cession of Gibraltar~ 
If America's allies demonstrated less than an eager-
ness to pursue the war at all costs in 1780 and 1781 by 
their involvement in a series of abortive peace efforts, so 
too did England suffer from the same malaise. The failure 
to achieve a decisive victory in America and the growing 
expense of a global war produced disaffection with the idea 
of a never-popular conquest of the colonies. David Hartley 
estimated the military and naval expenses of five years 
(1775-1780) of war in America at~71,875,ooo. 9 Hartley 
7 Ibid., pp. 173-174. 
8 . Ibid., p. 185. 
9David Hartley, An Address to the Committee of the 
County of Yol"k on the State of' Public Affairs (London, 1781) 
p. 6. 
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declared Britons had suffered losses of another ~30,000,000 
through increased taxes, the fall in stock prices and the 
destruction of the colonial trade as well as merchant marine 
losses to privateers. 
Piled atop the burdens of the American War for Great 
Britain, was a disastrous situation in Ireland, where trade 
restrictions were reducing the population to starvation. 
The effectiveness of the North Ministry in prosecuting the 
American war was sharply criticized both in and out of Par-
liament. The system of pensions, sinecures, fees and com-
missions by which those who purchased or were given govern-
ment posts and then enriched themselves came under the 
fiercest attack. Associations of freeholders were formed 
throughout England and Scotland to bring before Parliament 
a barrage of petitions demanding financial and electoral 
reforms. The Association movement brought together a 
variety of individuals seeking redress over grievances, all 
of which seemed to have been exacerbated by the American 
War and the accompanying international conflict in which 
Britain found herself entangled. 
David Hartley, a member of Parliament from Hull, and 
a consistent spokesman for conciliation with America, ex-
pressed many of the fears Britons felt after five years of 
unsuccessful war. Hartley, speaking before the Committee of 
the County of York, the Association unit in that locality, 
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in January, 1781, looked back to the events of 1780. He 
outlined the reasons for unrest in England--corruption in 
government, high taxes, the stalemated American War, 
England's diplomatic isolation and his perception of the 
growing threats to England's economy. 
"But, believe me," Hartley told his York listeners, 
the greatest of all evils now, and that which re-
quires instant remedy, is the American war: A war 
which has had its rise in pride and now derives its 
nourishment from corruption; a war which, from con-
tracts, perquisites, and exorbitant emoluments, may, 
perhaps, find advocates both in parliament and out 
of it; but which, I trust, will receive every con-
stitutional opposition from the justice and disin-
terested wisdom of the county of York and other 
associated counties. If some stop be not put to the 
American war, according to the unanimous resolution 
of the county of York, all your views of public re-
format ion will come too late; you will, alas! have 
no country to save.10 
Hartley pointed out that ending the American War was 
the key to England's problems. Resolutions demanding Par-
liament to act toward this end had already been endorsed by 
the County of York Association meeting on March 28, 1780, 
and by the County of Cambridge Association on April 10, 
1780.11 The American War as Hartley and others saw it in 
the fifth year of conflict had clearly become a no-win 
situation for Great Britain. Even a decisive British vie-
tory and an America forced into submission to British rule 
held no charms for Hartley. 
10 Ibid., p. 44. 
11 Ibid., p. 25. 
••• it would only be the commencement of our 
difficulties. The whole force of this country 
would then be bound down to America for ever. To 
maintain the conquest of such a country in reluctant 
subjection, 3000 miles distant, and 1500 miles in 
its own extent, would require, I believe I might 
venture to say, the whole force of Europe; but would 
certainly exceed the extremest powers of Great 
Britain. In such a case the House of Bourbon would 
have completely gained their end . . . but if they 
could once see the whole force of Great Britain 
bound down and fixt to the continent of America 
• • • • A new war would emerge upon us even out of 
our supposed victories . • • and perhaps brought 
home with terror and dismay to our own defenceless 
gates.12 
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For the sake of argument Hartley examined the pos-
sibility of a voluntary surrender and submission to British 
rule by the rebellious colonies, a development he saw as 
highly unlikely. Even this possibility left England 
threatened with the likelihood of a future test of strength 
with either Spain or France or both Joined in alliance with 
the restive Americans. Indeed, as Hartley looked at 
England's position at the beginning of 1781 the view was 
gloomy. 
We have not a single ally in the whole world, and 
every man's hand is lifted up against us. A little 
cloud arose in the West, at first no bigger than a 
man's hand, it has already cast its gloom over the 
horizon of our glory, it is spreading over our heads 
with darkness and dismay •••• 13 
The Hartley solution was 
That some kind of conciliation must take place at 
some period or other is most certain, because war 
12Ibid., p. 32. 
l3Ibid., p. 45. 
cannot be eternal. But for the terms, I fear, we 
cannot expect them now to be such as those which 
have been formerly offered to this country by the 
unanimous petitions of America, and ... rejected 
with disdain. The only rule which we have hitherto 
seemed to follow, has been to refuse the terms which 
might have been had at each particular time till it 
become too late, and then to contemplate the effects 
of our folly and passion with regret ..•. I be-
lieve that the wish to see America released from 
their engagements with France, and to re-unite that 
country in friendship and affection with ourselves, 
is much closer to the heart of the people of Great 
Britain, than the desire of recovering any reluctant 
dependance from them hereafter. 14 
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The stumbling block to conciliation that Hartley so 
deeply desired in order to save England from domestic trav-
ail and diplomatic hazards was that dreadful word "independ-
ence." He wished it " ••• could be removed, or even 
tacitly dispensed with." 1 5 But the hard facts remained for 
Hartley and for the Ministry to grapple with in the turmoil 
of 1780. "Perhaps," Hartley suggested, 
the simple concession of independence to America, an 
act of generosity and free grace, at the period of 
their approaching maturity, and flowing from our-
selves, might not have met with much reluctance in a 
wise, a liberal and a magnanimous people; it might at 
least, have rescued the honour of this country in the 
present fatal contest. But our Ministers have cut 
off this retreat from us, and that concession which 
might have been an act of choice, their conduct has 
rendered an action of compulsion.16 
14Ib1d., pp. 36-37. 
l5Ib1d., p. 37. 
16 Ibid., p. 41. 
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Even so, Hartley as a long-time advocate of concilia-
tion and reunion came to the conclusion that 
••• the only way, therefore, to defeat the effect 
of the French alliance with America, and "to accom-
plish a reunion with that country upon just, hon-
ourable and beneficial terms" is to proceed hence-
forward with sincerity, and conciliatory measures 
toward America •.•. 17 
Hartley as an M.P. from 1774 to 1780 earned a reputa-
tion among his fellow members as a dull, verbose speaker. 
"Wraxall says, 'His rising always operated like a dinner 
bell. 11118 Nonetheless his perception of the Ministry's pre-
dicament was incisive. The volatile mixture of domestic 
discontent, the American war and the ominous isolation of 
England in European affairs had bolled over in Parliament 
early in 1780 in Opposition attacks on the Ministry. These 
reached their peak in John Dunning's motion "That it is the 
opinion of this committee that the influence of the Crown 
has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished. 111 9 
The King's efforts to dump Lord North as his First Minister 
and build a new Ministry including some of the Opposition 
met with rejection. The Opposition, headed by Lord Rocking-
ham wanted a complete change in men and policies, not a to-
ken role in a coalition Ministry. As Hartley and others saw 
17rbid., p. 43. 
18Leslie Stephens and Sidney Lee, 
of National Biography (22 vols. London 
19 . Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 74. 
eds., The Dictionary 
1950 1885).IX, 68. 
it, the Ministry had led the nation into a quagmire from 
which there was no escape. 
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The spark which ignited the frustrations into a vio-
lent explosion was an inoffensive measure intended to relax 
the anti-Catholic strictures of English law. Hopefully, its 
passage would earn support of the war against Spain and 
France from English Catholics and discourage immigration to 
America of Irish tenant farmers. The law had passed both 
Houses of Parliament without a division. But opposition 
fanned by Protestant clergymen and a member of the House of 
Lords, George Gordon, resulted in demands for the law's 
repeal. Riots in Scotland against Catholic residences and 
chapels broke out. Gordon, as President of the Protestant 
Association of England, organized a London mass meeting of 
his supporters for June 2, 1780 to deliver a petition of 
repeal to the House of Commons. More than 60,000 joined 
Lord Gordon in marching on Parliament, and the mob quickly 
got out of hand. For the next eight days London was ter-
rorized as gangs attacked Catholic homes and chapels, sus-
pected supporters of the bill granting Catholics more 
freedom and anyone who opposed their looting and burning. 
Prisons were thrown open and destroyed and the Bank of 
England attacked before troops finally brought the riots to 
an end. Casualties amounted to about 800, and property 
damage ran in the hundreds of thousands of pounds. 20 
20Ibid., pp. 78-83. 
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The shock of the Lord Gordon riots and the suspicion 
that they had been instigated either by the Americans or the 
French and Spanish produced an outpouring of support for the 
threatened Ministry. In its aftermath came the news of the 
surrender of American forces besieged at Charleston. A 
swift call for a general election followed, and the North 
Ministry emerged with a slight majority in the House of Com-
mons. For both King George III and Lord North, the election 
appeared to support their views that the war in America must 
be pursued to a successful conclusion. 21 This in turn con-
tributed to the rejection of French and Spanish peace over-
tures and to the rejection of the efforts of Austria and 
Russia to re-establish a peace in Europe and America through 
their co-mediation at a Vienna peace congress. 
But even those who supported the North Ministry in its 
prosecution of the American war to a victorious end antici-
pated some form of reconciliation before reunion. Joseph 
Galloway had been forced to leave Philadelphia when British 
forces evacuated that city in 1778. Now in London in 178q 
his thoughts turned to mea~s of successfully bringing the 
war to an end and re-establishing the relationship between 
Great Britain and America on a new basis. 
A host of reasons pushed Galloway to his belief" ••• 
that this is a critical moment which Government ought to 
21 Ibid., p. 87. 
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embrace for establishing that system of polity in the colo-
nies which will hereafter secure them to Great Britain. 1122 
Galloway was confident that the loyalists in America and 
those Americans who had taken neither side in the conflict 
were ready to entertain new proposals for reunion. The 
American government under Congress was, in his opinion, a 
patchwork of failures. 
It is confidently asserted by Gentlemen(e) whose 
long residence in America has afforded them every 
means of information, and whose veracity stands un-
impeached, that not one fifth part of the people of 
America has at any period, supported from choice the 
American rebellion.23 
Galloway also pointed out that "Seven thousand provincials 
are actually serving in our Army. 1124 Americans, he said, 
had seen 
••• the contempt with which every petition had 
been received, and every remonstrance rejected; and 
looked forward to the time, when under the adminis-
tration of men in whom they could confide, and upon 
the adoption of measures they might have seen equit-
able, the Americans would revoke this declaration.25 
There was every good reason from Galloway's standpoint 
for reunion and an accommodation of American grievances by 
Great Britain. The value of the American colonial trade to 
22Joseph Galloway, Historical and Political Reflec-
tions on the Rise and Progress of the American Rebellion 
London, 1780) p. 116. 
23Joseph Galloway, Considerations Upon the American 
Enquir~ (London, 1779) p. 1 . 
24Ibid., p. 15. 
25Ibid., p. 8. 
84 
Great Britain, the dangers of a continuation of the Franco-
American alliance to Great Britain, the possibility of the 
loss of other British colonies in North America--Canada, the 
West Indies and the Bahamas and finally the importance of 
America's naval stores as a bulwark of Great Britain's sea-
power were all solid reasons in Galloway's eyes for the 
Ministry to take the initiative in seeking reconciliation. 
Galloway admitted the earlier reconciliation attempts 
had failed • 
• • • our failure hitherto has been owing to very 
gross mismanagement; and that though from their pub-
lic and formal acts it may appear otherwise, yet the 
people of America are favourable and friendly to our 
cause; and there is every reason to hope for future 
success from wise and vigorous measures.26 
Whatever may have been the reasons that no adequate 
·propositions, no terms which .could lead to a more con-
stitutional union between the countries, have been 
settled in British councils, and tendered to the 
Americans it is certainly high time, after a four 
years military contest, that it should be done.27 
Despite the appeals of men like Galloway and Hartley, 
British policy turned its back on conciliation as a domestic 
program. Diplomatically, Britain also rejected the offers 
of peace and mediation which stirred among America's allies 
and Europe's neutrals. Encouraged by the success at 
Charleston in May, 1780, Britain looked forward to military 
26aalloway, Historical and Political Reflections on 
the Rise and Progress of the American Rebellion, p.-55. 
27Ibid., p. 131. 
and naval campaigns of 1781 as the final steps to victories 
which would shatter the rebellion and bring the colonists to 
terms as well as drive the French from the West Indies. 
The gamble failed at Yorktown in October, 1781. The 
hint of disaster came earlier with the loss of Pensacola to 
Spain in May, 1781. And Yorktown was followed quickly by 
the recapture of St. Eustatius and San Martin in the West 
Indies by the French in November, 1781. The French also 
seized Demararra and Essequibo in January, 1782, and picked 
off British-held San Cristobal, Nevis and Montserrat in Feb-
ruary, 1782. This string of British disasters was completed 
with the surrender of Minorca to Spain in February, 1782. 28 
An angry opposition in Parliament was waiting after 
the Christmas recess. Not even the removal of the American 
Secretary, George Germain, would satisfy those members de-
termined to bring down the North Ministry and end the Ameri-
can War. The critical measure was a motion in Commons 
February 27, 1782 by General Conway, declaring as enemies of 
the King and nation any one attempting to carry on offensive 
war in America. The motion also granted permission for in-
troduction of an enabling act authorizing the King to make 
peace with the Colonies. Conway's motion carried by nine-
teen votes, a clear indication that the mood of Parliament 
28 Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution, 
p. 192. 
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29 
and perhaps the nation had shifted. Not until March 20th 
did Lord North notify the King of his unswerving determina-
tion to resign. In its final weeks, the North Ministry sent 
agents to Holland, and to France to attempt to split off 
America's allies with hints of terms more generous if they 
would abandon the Americans. John Adams at The Hague was 
also approached by a British agent suggesting a truce. 30 
But before these feelers moved beyond the opening stage 
their instigator, Lord North, was out of office, and a new 
Ministry took over the peace negotiations. 
The high ground of the watershed of 1778 had been 
passed, and by the end of 1781 the new trend had become 
clear enough for all to perceive. Events were moving in a 
different direction, and new men were at the helm of British 
policy. 
29 
Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 253. 
30 Ibid., pp. 256-257. 
CHAPTER V 
NEGOTIATIONS--THE LAST CHANCE 
FOR RECONCILIATION 
The fall of the North Ministry on March 20th made 
abundantly clear one central fact: the mood of Parliament 
and perhaps the nation in the Spring of 1782 demanded peace. 
No matter that British forces still held the key ports of 
Savannah, Charleston and New York. In addition, they had 
the capability to conduct raids in force outside these 
strong points--though perhaps at considerable risk of ir-
replaceable losses of manpower and materiel. Seven years of 
warfare, however, had demonstrated British inability to 
control any widespread area in the Colonies over an extended 
period. Britain's sea power was stretched perilously close 
to the breaking point around the world. She stood alone in 
Europe. The need for peace was written in bold letters for 
all to see. 1 
But the shape and details of peace both with the colo-
nies and their European allies were less clear. Much of 
what would be written into the final treaty between Great 
Britain and America remained to be determined by elements 
1vincent T. Harlow, The Founding of the Second British 
Empire (2 vols., London, 1952), I, 223. 
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beyond the grasp of the American negotiators. The King's 
stubbornness, Whig ambitions for power, the demands for do-
mestic reform in England and struggles for power among Whig 
politicians all had an impact on the negotiations. To this 
potpourri of conflicting forces must be added the personali-
ties of those who held office under George III, especially 
William Petty, the Earl of Shelburne. 
There is no doubt that Shelburne was the King's choice 
and the King's agent in the peace negotiations. Nonethe-
less, the events of 1782 were guided to a considerable 
extent by Shelburne's own conceptions of the American past 
and present, but most definitely by his perceptions of 
America's future role and its relationship to Great Britain. 
This perception of the American future by Shelburne changed 
to accommodate the developments of 1782 as the negotiations 
unfolded in Paris and military events strengthened Britain's 
position. Three subtly but distinctly different strategies 
emerge in Shelburne's scheme of peace-making. The first 
demonstrated Shelburne's belief that America would accept 
an autonomous role within the framework of the British 
Empire. It was a position consistent with Shelburne 1 s 
earlier declarations before assuming his ministerial 
role. These had certainly contributed to the esteem with 
which he was held by the King. 
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As the colonial response to the autonomy plan showed 
its failure, Shelburne swung to acceptance of American inde-
pendence with the retention of some sort of Federal alliance 
between the two nations. "Independence" in the usage of 
18th century England did not carry all of the same connota-
tions that it does to 20th century Americans. We have 
already seen that American independence in the view of one 
Englishman, John Cartwright, was compatible with a "Grand 
2 British League and Confederacy" providing a defense and 
trade umbrella covering both England and America. 3 Thus, 
"independence" in terminology of the 18th century did not 
necessarily mean sovereignity. During the middle period of 
the negotiations this kind of framework appeared to be Shel-
burne's objective. 
Finally, Shelburne came to sense the impossibility of 
an immediate political reconciliation between the colonies 
and Great Britain. His efforts shifted to a settlement 
which would assure that America did not become a French sat-
ellite, including a commercial treaty to guarantee continued 
Anglo-American trade and a hope that the generosity of the 
peace terms coupled with trade would lead to a future Fed-
eral Union between the two great Atlantic powers. The 
2cartwright, American Independence, the Interest and 
Glory of Great Britain, p. 1. 
3Ibid., p. 63. 
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treaty of peace which he largely fashioned was intended to 
encourage and accelerate the formation of a future trans-
atlantic grand alliance or federal union. 4 
Shelburne was a key member of the Rockingham Ministry, 
a strange melange of political viewpoints and personalities. 
The aged and ailing Lord Rockingham, leader of the opposi-
tion Whigs, was its nominal head as First Lord of the Treas-
ury. Shelburne's post was Secretary of State for Home, 
Colonial and Irish Affairs, and presumably, resolution of 
the American problem would fall within the scope of his 
responsibilities. 
Shelburne had indeed been the King's first choice to 
succeed North, but his support in Parliament was much too 
small to sustain him in the Prime·Ministership. Nonethe-
less, the King chose to consider Shelburne as Prime Minister 
de facto, and would deal with Rockingham only jointly with 
Shelburne or through Shelburne. 5 Shelburne thus because of 
his Cabinet assignment, and because of the King's reliance 
upon him became a key figure in directing the negotiations 
for peace and in shaping British policy. 
Why Shelburne? The question is an important one 
because of the role he was to play in the American peace 
4 Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, 
Empire, p. 228. 
5 Ibid., p. 225. 
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treaty. The Dublin-born Shelburne was known to support the 
idea of a strong monarchy, a position which commended him to 
George III. 6 In addition, he had spoken out on numerous 
occasions in Parliament against independence for America 
while at the same time supporting American rights. His 
background knowledge on American affairs included serving as 
Colonial Secretary in Chatham 1 s Ministry and as President of 
the Board of Trade in the Grenville Ministry. Thus, he had 
some claim of expertise in American affairs as well as hav-
ing enjoyed" •.• cordial relations with Benjamin Franklin 
117 and other prominent Americans . . • • These were attri-
butes obviously needed in resolving the problems England 
faced in the post-Yorktown months of 1782. On the other 
hand, his reputation as a domestic reformer was less radical 
than that of some Whigs who pressed for changes in Parlia-
mentary representation and curtailment of the King's auth-
ority. 
In brief, in a choice between evils, Shelburne 
appeared to the King to be the lesser, a man who 
might still pull out of his box of tricks one ghat 
would spare the King his crowning humiliation. 
But Shelburne brought to his task of peacemaking some 
grave political liabilities. He had been accused of 
6Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 257. 
7Harlow, The Founding or the Second British EmEire, 
p. 226. 
8Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 257. 
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deception so frequently, he had earned the nickname, ttthe 
Jesuit of Berkeley· Square." And as mentioned earlier, his 
personal following in Parliament was small.9 Within the 
Cabinet he faced a fierce personal and political rivalry 
with Charles James Fox, who held the post of Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs. Fox blamed Shelburne for bring-
ing about the removal of Fox's father from the lucrative 
office of Army paymaster some years earlier. The Fox-
Shelburne rivalry quickly generated the first issue of the 
American negotiations. Who was responsible for undertaking 
the peacemaking--Fox or Shelburne? Each had a claim to 
leadership and each had a different approach to the ques-
tion. 
When the Rockingham group took office on March 27, 
1782, it appeared that Fox would be in charge of negotia-
tions. A Minute of Cabinet March 30th recorded Cabinet 
agreement to evacuate British troops from Savannah, Charles-
ton and New York immediately. 10 This step, had it been 
taken, would have been a de facto grant of independence to 
the colonies, and placed th.e peace negotiations in Fox's 
sphere of foreign affairs. Fox argued that as Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs he would direct the negotiation of peace 
435. 
9Ib1d., p. 260. 
10 Fortescue, Correspondence of King George III, V, 
L 
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treaties with all the sovereign nations at war with Great 
Britain. Since a state of war clearly existed between Great 
Britain and her former colonies in North America, establish-
ing a peace with them was a logical extension of his respon-
sibilities. To assure his role--and necessarily to 
eliminate Shelburne 1 s--Fox proposed an immediate grant of 
independence to the American colonies. This would be fol-
lowed by a quick peace treaty, and the end of American 
participation in what had become a global war. A crack in 
the Franco-American alliance would be made. Britain freed 
from the burden of the American War would then be in a posi-
tion to negotiate better terms of peace with its other 
enemies, France, Spain and Holland. The forever unanswered 
question will be: was Fox's plan motivated by his personal 
rivalry with Shelburne? Or did events simply fan the flames 
of the natural antagonism between the two men? 
Shelburne obviously had a contrasting approach to the 
peace negotiations. He argued that independence should be 
granted to the Americans only as the first condition of a 
peace treaty. The initial Rockingham proposal for evacuat-
ing the key American seaports seems to have died primarily 
because of Shelburne's alternative plans. The belief grew 
that Shelburne sought a new relationship between England 
11 
and America short of independence. His position as 
11 Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 260. 
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Colonial Secretary, and his known views on America as well 
as his insistence on controlling negotiations appeared to 
support this position. His previous speeches in Parliament 
had clearly established his opposition to independence, but 
granting to Americans many of the privileges they asked for. 
As a follower of Lord Chatham and a supporter of the Empire 
he had spoken out against a final break between England and 
the Colonies. 
In a major address on the American question in April, 
1778, Shelburne told the House of Lords, " ••. he was fully 
convinced that America was not lost. 1112 He went on to point 
out that acceptance of the idea of American independence 
could only lead to future loss of Canada, the West Indies 
and the Bahamas. "America must obtain justice and security, 
and whatever difficulties may arise to obstruct it, I have 
no doubt but she may be again happily reunited to Great 
Britain," he added. 13 Later in November of the same year, 
Shelburne emphasized to the House of Lords, "A real union 
must be ·rormed upon the plan of the British constitution 
1114 
. . . . 
Shelburne's ideas for the future were not, however, 
confined to considerations of immediate expediency. 
He was deeply convinced that the British Constitu-
tion (purged and reformed) was the surest guarantee of 
12Parliamentary History, XIX, 1032. 
13Ibid., p. 1052. 
14Ib1d., p. 1310. 
liberty and had, moreover, a universal validity; a 
proposition which on the second count still awaits 
final determination. Conscious of the gigantic 
potentialities of the North American continent, he 
considered that the abandonment by the Thirteen 
Colonies of a balanced monarchical system of govern-
ment and their consequent decline into "democratical" 
republicanism and probable anarchy would be a major 
catastrophe. On the other hand, the colonization of 
a continent under free ordered government, and di-
rected by a completely autonomous American authority, 
linked to Britain by allegiance to a common Crown, 
would mean the growth of a great transatlantic 
society, practising and guaranteeing for its parts 
political and economic freedom.15 
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Further indications of Shelburne's position come from 
a letter written by one of North's agents to John Adams, 
"Lord Shelburne is the only new minister suspected of not 
wishing to go the length of declaring American independ-
16 
ence." On the other hand, John Norris in his biography of 
Shelburne declares the idea of reconciliation was shared by 
other Cabinet members. 
Shelburne has been pictured as the lone liberal 
champion of the idea of federal union. But the 
truth is that it was a popular idea among the mem-
bers of the new Ministry in the spring of 1782 and 
by no means peculiar to Shelburne.17 
Norris gives as his source the London General Advertiser of 
June 14, 1782. 
Dualism of policy had been a hallmark of the North 
Ministry, and the Rockingham team quickly established its 
15Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, 
p. 228. 
16Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 260. 
17John Norris, Shelburne and Reform (London, 1963) 
p. 167. 
96 
own adeptness at this tactic. Faced with two rival Minis-
ters, each determined to pursue differing methods of bring-
ing the American War to an end, the Cabinet permitted each 
to proceed simultaneously. It was further evidence of Rock-
ingham's inability to direct affairs as well as the special 
position Shelburne held in relation to the King. Further, 
the Cabinet in its modern sense did not exist in 1782. Each 
Minister operated his department as a separate unit and was 
responsible directly to the King rather than a Prime Minis-
ter .18 So both Shelburne and Fox, each in his own way, 
sought the road to peace with America. 
Even before news of the North Ministry's fall reached 
Paris, Franklin seized-a convenient opportunity to write di-
rectly to Shelburne. Writing as an old friend, Franklin 
hinted at American desires for peace, and expressed his con-
tinued friendship and admiration for Shelburne. The let-
ter's arrival provided Shelburne the opening he needed in 
his power struggle with Fox. With Cabinet concurrence he 
dispatched a representative, Richard Oswald, to Paris to 
meet and sound out Franklin. Simultaneously, Henry Laurens, 
former President of the Continental Cong~ess and also an 
American Peace Commissioner, though a British prisoner, was 
gran~ed parole from the Tower of London and sent to The 
l8Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, 
p. 223. 
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Netherlands to test the peace possibilities with John Adams, 
another American Peace Commissioner. Adams was also Minis-
ter to The Netherlands on behalf of Congress. The Laurens-
Adams talks seemed to indicate an inflexible American 
position on independence. But Richard Oswald's report of 
his meetings with Franklin were more promising to Shel-
burne' s reconciliation gambit. 
Oswald, an elderly ~cottish merchant, appears to be a 
strange choice for the diplomatic mission at hand. Yet he 
had been carefully selected for a number of reasons. He was 
a long-time acquaintance of Shelburne, who had met him 
through the economist, Adam Smith. He had lived in America 
as a young man, and still owned property there. He was sym-
pathetic to the American cause, but hopeful that the Colo-
nies would agree to a status short of independence. In 
short, his political thinking as it related to America 
seemed close to Shelburne's. And since some sort of commer-
cial agreement appeared essential to bringing about Shel-
burne's new Anglo-American relationship, Oswald, as a 
merchant trader and American businessman seemed to have the 
knowledge required. Moreover, by age, personality and back-
ground he appeared more likely to establish a cordial rela-
tionship with Franklin, then England's best chance for 
peace, than any other available agent. 19 
l9Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution, 
p. 194. 
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Oswald reached Paris on April 12th. His mission was 
to sound out Franklin on the possibility of a separate peace 
between England and Amer~ca. Franklin quickly established 
that France and America would work jointly for a peace. To 
hammer home that point, Franklin and Oswald visited 
Vergennes at Versailles on April 17th. Vergennes reiterated 
Franklin's stand that a general peace negotiated with all 
belligerents was the only course acceptable to France. 
However, before Oswald returned to London, Franklin 
met privately with Shelburne's emissary. Franklin's purpose 
as he relates 1 t, was to ". . . draw out something of the 
Mind of hls Court on the Subject of Canada and Nova 
Scotia. 112° Franklin's suggestion that Great Britain volun-
tarily cede Nova Scotia and Canada to the new United States 
as a gesture of friendship and to forestall future conflicts 
has been viewed by most historians with some amazement. 
Such a step had no endorsement from the French from whom 
Franklin concealed his proposal. Bemis suggests Franklin's 
role in the abortive attempt to capture Montreal and Quebec 
in 1775-76 " ... had the result of fixing Canada as a quest 
21 in Franklin's subtle mind." Morris ls equally puzzled at 
Franklin's proposal. 
20 Smyth, The Writings of Benjamin Franklin, VIII, 469. 
21 Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution, 
p. 197. 
It is inexplicable that the principal proponent 
of diplomatic unity with the French ally would en-
trust to an enemy's hands a document revealing that 
America was prepared to accept territory whose ac-
quisition by the United States France had long 
opposed, and make such a proposal behind the backs 
of his good friends in the French Ministry.22 
But Franklin's perplexing proposal was indeed some-
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11 i f rr23 thing both . . . curious and s gni leant • • • • Frank-
lin, putting his ideas before Oswald, stressed that "his 
Nation seem'd to desire Reconciliation with America; that I 
1124 heartily wish'd the same thing . . • . Should Britain 
continue to hold Canada, Franklin added that the hazards 
" ••• would necessarily oblige us to cultivate and 
strengthen our Union with France."25 At Oswald's request 
and after a little delay, Franklin gave to Oswald a copy of 
his "Notes for Conversation" on Canada and the reasons why 
it should be voluntarily ceded to the former British colo-
nies, now called the United States. 
Franklin's arguments repeated the theme that "By the 
late Debates in Parliament, and publick Writings, it 
appears that Britain desires a Reconciliation with the 
26 Americans." As for reparations, Franklin suggested, 
22Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 264. 
23 Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, 
p. 248. 
24 Smyth, The Writings of Benjamin Franklin, VII, 470. 
25Ib1d. 
26Ibid., p. 471. 
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••• But would it not be better for England to 
offer it? Nothing would have a greater Tendency to 
conciliate, and much of the future Commerce and re-
turning Intercourse between the two Countries may 
depend on Reconciliation. Would not the advantage 
of Reconciliation by such means be greater than the 
Expence?27 
He added, 
But on the Minds of people would it not have an ex-
cellent effect, if Britain should voluntarily offer 
to give up this Province; tho' on these Conditions, 
that she shall in all times coming have and enjoy 
the right of Free Trade thither, unincumbered with 
any Duties whatsoever; that so much of the vacant 
Lands there shall be sold, as will raise a sum suf-
ficient to pay for the Houses burnt by the British 
troops and their Indians; and also to indemnify the 
Royalists for the Confiscation of their Estates?28 
Franklin was aware that Oswald and the man he repre-
sented, Lord Shelburne, were identified with a group" ••• 
who looked to an expanding partnership between British manu-
facturer and American pioneer as being in the best interests 
of both. 1129 Thus his proposal was a shrewd test of the sin-
cerity of British appeals for reconciliation. It was a 
signal from Franklin to Shelburne of his willingness to pur-
sue reconciliation and a warning that reconciliation meant 
making America the sole agent of Anglo-American authority in 
North America, not a subordinate partner. This would be the 
27 Ibid., p. 472. 
28Ibid. 
29 Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, 
p. 248. 
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only guarantee of British objectives Americans could recog-
nize and accept. For it would remove once and for all Brit-
ish military power from the American continent. The idea of 
free trade further suggests a test of English willingness to 
bring Americans within the scheme of Empire navigation regu-
lations, and to re-establish trade between England and 
America on these principles. If indeed Lord Shelburne's 
emissary carried a message of conciliation, Franklin opened 
wide the doorway to the future. From an American standpoint 
these were the terms which would make it possible for a 
restoration of the Anglo-American relationship as Franklin 
saw it. Oswald responded that" ... 
clearer, more satisfactory • . ,,30 
nothing . . • could be 
At least, Oswald 
offered no immediate objections to Franklin's ideas, asking 
for a copy of his notes and carrying them back to Shelburne 
in London. Perhaps, at no time was reconciliation so close 
to realization as it was in the first meeting between Oswald 
and Franklin. 
Laurens' visit to Adams at Haarlem on April 15th pro-
duced less encouraging news than Oswald brought back. It 
appeared that America's peace commissioners were agreed that 
a peace settlement arrived at in concert with America's 
allies was the only basis on which they would undertake 
30
smyth, The Writings of Benjamin Franklin, VIII, 473. 
102 
negotiations. In addition, Adams seemed much less respon-
sive to English approaches than was Franklin. For the stub-
born Adams demanded British recognition of American 
independence as a precondition to even starting negotiations. 
This was more than the tactful Franklin had asked in his 
meetings with Oswald. 
Shelburne was hopefully probing for the channel 
through which the Colonies could still be retained as a part 
of the Empire. 
In Shelburne's mind the American and the Irish 
problems were both "imperial" and were closely 
associated. His handling of the Irish demand for 
independence in 1782 was on parallel lines to his 
approach to the American Commissioners in Paris. 
But the self-government for America and Ireland 
within the Empire which he strove to establish 
would have approximated in degree, if not in form, 
to that enjoyed by the British Dominions in 1914--
with the addition of an Imperial Zollverein and a 
"Free trade" connection between the British group 
and one or more foreign powers.31 
The Cabinet on April 23rd agreed that Oswald should 
return to Paris. He was directed to meet with Franklin to 
designate Paris as the site of future negotiations and set 
up a schedule of meetings. But Oswald was given no author-
ity to enter into negotiations with Franklin. He was 
..• "to represent to him (Franklinl that the 
principal points in contemplation are the allow-
ance of independence to America, upon Great Britain 
31 Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, 
I, 232. 
being restored to the situation she was placed in 
by the Treaty of 1763."32 
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Does the word "independence" indicate that as early as 
April 23rd Shelburne had already abandoned autonomy in favor 
of full American sovereignity? There is considerable doubt 
that Shelburne or Whig politicians attached the same conno-
tations to "independence" which Americans did then or now. 
George III writing to Shelburne on another matter April 12th 
listed among the terms on which the Rockingham Ministry took 
office. "No veto to the Independence of America. 1133 Still 
the King persisted in a hope until much later that America 
would accept less than full sovereignity.34 The word as 
used clearly lacks precision, and its meaning ranged from 
independence in local government to full sovereignity. 
A further indicator of this interpretation is the fact 
that the same April 23rd Cabinet meeting set in motion in-
structions to Sir Guy Carleton, now commander of British 
military forces in America, and to Admiral Robert Digby, 
naval commander, to seek a truce. Both Bemis and Morris 
view Carleton's appeals to Washington, to Congress, and 
finally to the public as an attempt to by-pass the American 
32 Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 268. 
33Fortescue, Correspondence of King George III, V, 452. 
34 Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 286. 
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Peace Commissioners. II Lord Shelburne did not overlook 
the chance of separate peace negotiations with the 'Prov-
inces' on American soil. 11 35 "Notwithstanding the fiasco of 
the Carlisle Commission to Congress in 1778, he [Shelburne] 
decided to make another direct appeal to Congress and the 
American people."36 
There is also the possibility, elaborated by Morris, 
that the Carleton-Digby efforts were a part of Shelburne's 
plan of reconciliation with America on terms short of inde-
pendence. "As if to emphasize his personal involvement in 
the fate of this mission, Shelburne dispatched his private 
secretary, Maurice Morgann, to Join Carleton in New York. 1137 
But Morgann's reports to Shelburne offered no encouragement 
for any restoration of imperial relationships between 
America and England. 
Fitzmaurice, Shelburne's biographer, sees the messages 
Carleton and Digby were directed to convey to Washington and 
to Congress in a somewhat different light. It was an effort 
to husband British resources for the war still in progress 
in other theaters. The British hoped as well to discourage 
the Americans from launching attacks on the remaining Brit-
ish garrisons in New York, Charleston and Savannah, and to 
35Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution, 
p. 201. 
36Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 268. 
37 Ibid., p. 269. 
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insure that the negotiations in Paris were not jeopardized 
by American support of French or Spanish campaigns in the 
summer of 1782. There was no intention, Fitzmaurice 
believes, of by-passing the American Peace Commissioners in 
Paris or seeking terms of less than independence from 
Congress. Shelburne's instructions were at least ambiguous. 
"You must therefore convince them," Shelburne wrote to 
Carleton and Digby, "that the great object on this country 
is, not merely peace, but reconciliation with America on the 
noblest terms and by the noblest means. 11 38 Whatever the 
true purpose of the Carleton-Digby proposals, they failed to 
ignite any interest in America. General Washington passed 
on Carleton's proposals to Congress, which refused to con-
sider a truce or any other negotiations while the Peace Com-
missioners in Paris remained charged with that duty. 
Oswald returned to Paris on May 4th. On May 8th he 
was joined by Thomas Grenville, representing the Secretary 
for Foreign Affairs, Fox. The duel between Shelburne and 
Fox over control of the American negotiations had begun in 
earnest. This rivalry was encouraged by Franklin's skillful 
hints that Grenville's commission was incomplete and inade-
quate for the American peace negotiations.39 When the 
Enabling Act authorizing the King to undertake peace nego-
38 Fitzmaurice, The Life of William Petty, Earl of 
Shelburne, II, 135-130:-
39Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 276. 
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tiations with the Americans finally cleared Parliament on 
June 17th, 40 Shelburne moved ahead with a commission for 
Oswald as the negotiator. Fox responded with a demand for 
Oswald's recall, which was overruled by the Cabinet. On 
June 30th, in a Cabinet meeting Fox deliberately challenged 
the Shelburne position with the proposal that American inde-
pendence should be granted with or without a peace treaty. 
The Cabinet voted down his plan, and Fox resigned. 41 A day 
later Lord Rockingham died, a victim of the influenza epi- _ 
demic sweeping Europe. The King quickly offered the post of 
First Lord of the Treasury to Lord Shelburne on July 2nd. 42 
The American negotiations were now completely within control 
of the English leader who had conspicuously advocated recon-
ciliation and reunion both as a member of the Opposition and 
the Administration. 
Fears that Britain's use of the word "independence" 
did not coincide with their own grew in the American Peace 
Commission in Paris, now increased by the arrival of John 
Jay from Madrid. Franklin recorded in his "Journal of 
Negotiations for Peace" on June 27th a warning from French 
intelligence of English efforts to" ... stir up the People 
40Ibid., p. 280. 
41Ib1d. 
42Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, 
I, 261. 
,, 
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to call on Congress to accept those Terms, they being simi-
lar to those settling with Ireland. 1143 And writing to 
Benjamin Vaughan on July 11th, Franklin quotes from Vaughn's 
earlier May 11th letter a reference to "•a proposed depend-
ent State of America which you thought Mr. Oswald would 
begin with.' "44 Franklin also told Vaughn, 
It is now intimated to me from several quarters, 
that Lord Shelburne's plan is, to retain the sover-
eignty for the King, giving us otherwise an inde-
pendent Parliament, and a government similar to that 
of late intended for Ireland. If this be really his 
project, our negotiations for peace will not go very 
far.45 
Franklin also recognized Shelburne's belief in a continuing 
Anglo-American relationship and his desire for reconcilia-
tion. II • Though Lord Shelburne might formerly have 
entertained such an idea, he had probably dropped it before 
he sent Mr. Oswald here . 1146 . • • Franklin wrote in the 
almost certain knowledge his words would reach Shelburne via 
the gossipy Vaughn. 
Thus, July, 1782 appears to mark an end to the first 
phase of Shelburne's plan for reconciliation and reunion. 
Franklin's signal of willingness to proceed had carried a 
43
smyth, The Writings of Benjamin Franklin, VIII, 555. 
44Ibid., p. 565 
45 Ibid., p. 566. 
46Ibid. 
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price, Canada, which was beyond the political realities in 
Parliament. The soundings at Haarlem, and at New York via 
Digby and Carleton had been negative. On the other hand, 
Shelburne's rival, Fox, had been eliminated from the 
Cabinet, and with Rockingham's demise, Shelburne was in full 
control of the negotiations. 
In Paris on July 10th, Franklin delivered to Oswald 
his ideas of the four necessary articles and four advisable 
articles for inclusion in the pending peace treaty. The 
four necessary items were 
• • • Independence full and complete in every sense, 
to the Thirteen States • • • • settlement of the 
boundaries; ••• confinement of the boundary of 
Canada • . • • freedom of fishing En the banks of 
Newfoundland and elsewhere . . • • 7 
Franklin's advisable articles were indemnification of 
Americans for property damage caused by the war; admission 
of war guilt by the British; the United States to enjoy 
the same trade rights in England and Ireland as English 
subjects; and finally cession of Canada. 48 The emphasis 
and detailed definition Franklin placed upon the first 
necessary article of the peace terms, independence, is a 
clear indication of how critical this issue had become. 
Obviously, the American negotiators recognized the 
47 Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution, 
p. 207. 
48
rbid., 207 208 pp. - . 
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differences in interpretation placed upon this word. In 
addition, Franklin firmly broke off further talks with 
Oswald the next day pending a clarification of the British 
interpretation of independence. 49 
To Oswald's quick pleas for clarification of the Brit-
ish position and intentions on independence, Lord Shelburne 
responded in a letter dated July 27th. He also enclosed a 
copy of his earlier instructions to Carleton and Digby in 
America, showing his moves there to bring about a truce were 
directed toward American withdrawal from the war and dis-
couraging her further efforts on behalf of France and Spain. 
Shelburne's instructions to Oswald pledged" ••• the most 
unequivocal acknowledgement of American Independency 
1150 Shelburne promised a commission authorizing 
Oswald to conclude a treaty with the Americans on the basis 
of" .•• the Independency of the Colonies •• Hav-
ing made these firm declarations, Shelburne once more added 
an ambiguity for which he became notorious: 
You very well know I have never made a secret of 
the deep concern I feel in the separation of coun-
tries united by blood, by principles, habits and 
every tie short of territorial proximity ..•• 
That it shall be done decidedly, so as to avoid all 
49 Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 293. 
SOibid., p. 294. 
5libid., p. 295. 
future riske of enmity, and lay the foundation of 
a new connection better adapted to the present 
temper and interests of both countries . . . . My 
private opinion would lead me to go a great way 
for Federal union; but is either country ripe for 
it? If 5~ot means must be left to advance it 
. . 
110 
When his commission arrived on August 6th Oswald was 
further adjured " .•• to do everything in his power to pre-
vent the United States from entering into a binding connec-
tion with any other power. 1153 He was also urged". 
to propose an unreserved system of naturalization as the 
1154 foundation of a future amicable connection . . . . 
Oswald's letter on independence from Shelburne and his 
later instructions illustrated his changing view toward 
America. Instead of reconciliation within the Empire, 
America was to be linked to Great Britain by a possible 
federal union or through a form of dual citizenship of its 
residents. Both terms defy definition and Shelburne never 
presumed to provide more precise meaning to them. They are 
evidence, however, of his efforts to· find the path which 
would continue some kind of relationship between Great 
Britain and its former colonies. It is clearly a different 
path than his earlier efforts sought. But it continued the 
52 Fitzmaurice, The Life of William Pet~ Earl of 
Shelburne, II, 169. 
53
rb1d., p. 170. 
54
Ib1d. 
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concept of reconciliation which might ultimately lead to 
genuine reunion between Great Britain and America. 
So far as the actual treaty terms, Shelburne 1 s letter 
of July 27 committed him only to Franklin's four necessary 
articles--independence, abandonment of any British claim to 
territory north of the Ohio added to Canada under the Quebec 
Act, and granting to America of fishery rights off Newfound-
land. 55 Franklin's advisable articles were dismissed as 
unacceptable. The sticking point, however, was Oswald's 
commission, which referred not to the United States by name, 
but to 
. any commissioner or commissioners, named or to 
be named by the said colonies and plantations, or 
with any body or bodies, corporate or politic, or 
any assembly or assemblies, or descriptions of men, 
or person or persons whatsoever . • • • or any part 
or parts thereor.56 
The wording of Oswald's Commission may have been a 
deliberate attempt to test the unity of the American Commis-
sioners and their allies. More likely it was shaped by 
British reluctance to grant anything which could be con-
strued as independence for America in advance of a binding 
agreement for peace. For Shelburne 1 s intention--indeed, 
Fox's too--had been to reach a peace settlement with America 
or with her European allies separately so as to strengthen 
55 Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 295. 
56 Ibid., p 296. 
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Britain's hand in dealing with whichever were the remaining 
belligerent forces. John Jay's angry rejection of the 
Oswald commission without explicit recognition of America's 
status as a nation when contrasted to Franklin and 
Vergennes' acceptance signalled what England and Shelburne 
had been waiting for--a split among the Allies.57 Suddenly, 
in late August Franklin became seriously ill; for the fore-
seeable future the negotiations would be in the hands of 
Jay, who had already clashed with Vergennes as well as 
America's other ally, Spain. 
John Jay was the crack in the Franco-American 
alliance, and the question presented to Shelburne was how 
best to exploit it. Earlier events limited his options. 
Parliament in February had voted an end to offensive warfare 
in America. He could not seek a quick peace with the Euro-
pean belligerents, and then turn on America. Peace with 
America had to come first. Thus, on August 23, 1782 the 
Cabinet authorized the dispatch of reinforcements to 
Gibraltar, then besieged by a joint French-Spanish force.58 
Five days later Shelburne presented to Cabinet his plans for 
peace with America. The British strategy of reconciliation 
and reunion entered its third and final phase. After a day 
57Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, 
I, 277, 283. 
58 Fortescue, Correspondence of King George III, VI, 
113. 
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of hesitancy the Cabinet agreed" .•• to offer generous 
terms to the Americans including a compromise on independ-
ence .1159 Shelburne's cabinet agreed the basis for peace 
would be Franklin's four necessary articles. In addition, 
Oswald's instructions as determined by the Cabinet 11 ••• 
permitted him to waive stipulating by treaty for payment of 
prewar debts owing British merchants as well as for compen-
sation to the Loyalists. 1160 These terms did not reach 
Oswald in Paris until September 4th. Meanwhile two days 
earlier, Jay produced a solution to the deadlock over the 
wording of Oswald's commission describing the American 
plenipotentiaries. Jay proposed to Oswald the phrase "the 
Thirteen United States of America," as the designation for 
the American Peace Commissioners' constituency. 61 Franklin 
concurred in the change, and Oswald wrote to request the re-
wording. The Cabinet with some reluctance approved the 
change on September 18th. The tempest over the wording of 
Oswald's commission seems strange in light of Shelburne's 
letter to Oswald for Franklin in April. Then Shelburne had 
said 
59 Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 317. 
60 Ibid., p. 318. 
61 Ibid., p. 335. 
• • • on our part commissions will be moved, or any 
character given to Mr. Oswald, which Dr. Franklin 
and he may judge conducive to a final settlement of 
terms between Great Britain and America.62 
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Britain's terms as stated in Oswald's August 29th 
instructions sketched in outline form Shelburne 1 s American 
policy; peace, independence without client status to any 
nation, encouragement to Americans to look westward to the 
vast undeveloped interior of western America and the pos-
sibility of close commercial ties which could conceivably 
lead to reunion at some distant date. 63 The logic behind 
the final stage of Shelburne 1 s reconciliation plan was 
simply that generous terms of the Americans coupled with a 
commercial treaty might accomplish the reunion which could 
not be achieved through negotiation at Paris. It was a 
policy consistent with every position Shelburne had declared 
earlier as a member of Lords, and as Colonial Secretary in 
the Rockingham Ministry when he sought to re-establish the 
Anglo-American relationship through direct political ties. 
Accomplishment of Shelburne's plan was to prove more 
difficult. The Cabinet's August 29th instructions to Oswald 
had been agreed to only reluctantly by the Lord Chancellor, 
Edward Thurlow, and Lord Ashburton. Since the Cabinet meet-
ing which ratified Oswald's instructions, news had reached 
62 Fitzmaurice, The Life of William Petty, Earl or 
Shelburne, II, 136. 
63Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution, 
p. 212. 
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London on September 30th of the total defeat of the French-
Spanish forces besieging Gibraltar. The urgency for England 
to gain an early peace was dwindling. The pressures upon 
individual Cabinet members from interest groups within 
England were growing If the terms of the Anglo-American 
peace treaty were to be built largely upon Franklin's four 
necessary articles large and vocal segments of the British 
public might be angered. These included those with holdings 
in America confiscated by the rebels, merchants owed debts 
by Americans, Canadian traders, the refugee Loyalists who 
had fled to England or other English colonies and the hard-
core colonialists in England opposed to all things American. 
The political climate in London had cooled signifi-
cantly from what it had been in late August by the time the 
draft of a preliminary treaty written by Jay and agreed to 
by Oswald reached London on October 11th. Not only did the 
proposed Treaty follow Franklin's four necessary articles, 
it also provided for reciprocal free trade between America 
and the British Empire--exempting only the Hudson's Bay and 
64 East India monoplies. In line with Shelburne's expressed 
concept" ... that it shall be done decidedly, so as to 
avoid all future risk of enmity ... " the boundaries were 
64 Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 347. 
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generous. 65 The future United States was to extend west-
ward to the Mississippi, despite the efforts of its allies, 
France and Spain, to limit it to the Allegheny-Appalachian 
line. Fishery rights on Newfoundland were also established 
in the draft treaty. 
When the Cabinet met on October 17th it found the pro-
posed treaty unacceptable from several standpoints. It was 
impossible to grant reciprocal free trade rights to the 
American nation by treaty without the prior passage of 
enabling legislation by Parliament. Thus, Oswald was di-
rected to remove any language about commercial reciprocity, 
and propose that commercial matters be postponed to sub-
sequent negotiation. The Cabinet insisted that Americans 
recognize and promise to pay their prewar debts to English 
merchants. The Newfoundland fishery rights were viewed 
skeptically and Oswald told drying rights on Newfoundland 
and Labrador could not be granted. Finally, there was the 
question of compensating Loyalists in America for their loss 
of property through confiscation and riot, Oswald was di-
rected to use a demand for the Old Northwest Territory 
(north of the Ohio River) or for an enlarged Nova Scotia as 
a lever to gain something for the Loyalists. " .•• He 
65 Fitzmaurice, The Life of William Pettl, Earl of 
Shelburne, II, 169. 
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should state Your Majesty's right to the Back Country and 
urge it as a means of providing for the Refugees ...• 1166 
For Shelburne time was running out. Parliament was 
scheduled to meet on November 26th, and he needed a treaty 
in hand before that date. The remaining issues--fisheries, 
debts and Loyalists--were in no instance critical to his 
concept of peace, but each individually had the potential 
for blocking the ratification of the treaty in Parliament. 67 
Two more drafts passed between Paris and London. The King 
was persuaded to prorogue Parliament until December 5th to 
allow the negotiators a few more days in which to try to 
find agreement. The final compromise reached on November 
29th adjusted the fishery to a liberty rather than a right. 68 
The Americans agreed ·that Congress would recommend to the 
states restitution of Loyalist property and a cessation of 
future confiscations.69 
The treaty in its final draft was still fundamentally 
Franklin's four necessary articles and Oswald's August 29th 
instructions from Shelburne. The final critical session 
on the fisheries, debts and. Loyalists had done nothing to 
66 Fortescue, Correspondence of King George III, VI, 
p. 144. 
67 Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, 
I, 290. 
68 Bemis, The Diplomac~ of the American Revolution, 
p. 261. 
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alter the overall objective of Shelburne's diplomacy--
reconciliation and ultimately reunion. True, the framework 
within which his plans would operate had changed. From 
initially a simple grant of legislative autonomy to the 
North American colonies, Shelburne adjusted his plan to 
political realities on both sides of the Atlantic. Federal 
union or common citizenship had also been tested and was 
found unacceptable. The final plan--generous terms and a 
proposed swift move to restore commercial.ties which might 
lead to ultimate reunion--had succeeded. 
Shelburne hated the idea of separation. For him 
it was something vicious and unnatural, a failure 
that would gravely injure both societies. They came 
of the same stock; they represented the same cul-
ture; and their destinies were inexorably interwoven. 
As he saw it, America could not deny her heritage 
of Anglo-Saxon institutions without disaster to 
herself .••• By means of parliamentary, adminis-
trative and fiscal reforms, he set himself to pro-
vide the Anglo-American association of the future 
with a "new deal." Meantime, he reluctantly 
accepted separation as unavoidable and endeavored to 
establish interim conditions that would facilitate 
and not impede the process of reconciliation.70 
Not only had the progress toward peace between England 
and America been shaped by Britain's policy of reconcilia-
tion and reunion, so too had the terms itself felt its 
impact. But one major element of the policy remained 
unresolved--the restoration of commercial ties between Great 
Britain and its former colonies. 
70Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, 
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CHAPTER VI 
RATIFICATION, COMMERCIAL NEGOTIATIONS 
AND THE END OF RECONCILIATION 
If legend and tradition contain a germ of truth, it 
was a foggy, gray Thursday, December 5, 1782 when George III 
made his grim announcement of American independence in the 
speech opening Parliament's fall session. Reportedly the 
last King of America hesitated as if choking before he 
uttered the despised word "independence."1 Once he had 
overcome his initial repugnance, the King was able to artic-
ulate the peace objectives of the First Lord of the Treas-
ury, the Earl of Shelburne. These aimed at " .•• an entire 
and cordial reconciliation with those colonies." 2 "Rell-
gion, language, interests, affections," the King told his 
listeners in Westminster, "may and I hope will yet prove 
bonds of permanent union between the two countries; to this 
end neither attention nor disposition on my part shall be 
wanting." 3 
Shelburne in December, 1782 could look back on a major 
diplomatic triumph--bringing the Americans to terms in what 
1 Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 412. 
2 Parliamentary History, XXIII, 206. 
3rbid., 207. 
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appeared to be a politically acceptable peace treaty. He 
still faced the prospect of winning ratification in Parlia-
ment where he had never commanded a substantial personal 
group, and where he could claim no party following. In 
addition, he faced the task of achieving acceptance of a 
major revision in England's trade policy toward America and 
the world by revamping the Navigation Acts. This would be 
essential before a commercial treaty could be negotiated 
and the ties between Great Britain and her former colonies 
restored. "The peace treaty," as Shelburne saw it, "could 
thus be a first step leading to a rapprochement; at the 
least, to friendship and commercial alliance, and perhaps in 
the end to some form of political association. 114 
In accomplishing both steps, Shelburne faced major 
hazards. Never a charismatic figure nor even a skillful 
politician, Shelburne had also acquired numerous enemies in 
his career. They ranged from Charles James· Fox, his rival 
for power in the Rockingham Ministry to Viscount Keppel, 
First Lord of the Admiralty, who had resigned from Shel-
burne' s cabinet at the first word of the preliminary terms. 
Shelburne faced a Parliament which included men who had 
suffered financially from his Administrative reforms, who 
feared his zeal for electoral change and who were prepared 
4 Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, 
I, 234. 
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to cling to the comfortable patterns of trade under the 
Navigation Acts. But above all Shelburne carried the burden 
of responsibility for ending the American War. From hind-
sight, North, Germain, Stormont and all the others who had 
found victory or reconciliation on Ministry terms so elusive 
from 1775 onward suddenly discovered in Shelburne the source 
of all of their failures. If only he had continued the 
war instead of seeking peace, their policies might have been 
vindicated. 
When the terms of the American as well as the French 
and Spanish treaties were revealed to Parliament on January 
27, 1783 the onslaught against Shelburne began. Loyalists, 
Canadian fur traders and fishery interests commenced an out-
cry over what they viewed as unnecessary concessions to 
Americans which had damaged them. As Shelburne had fore-
seen, the greatest protests arose from the Loyalists and 
their friends. They ignored the promise implicit in the 
King's opening speech 
.. ·• I trust that you will agree with me, that a 
due and generous attention ought to be shown towards 
those who have relinquished their property or pro-
fessions from motives of lo~alty to me, or attach-
ment to the mother country.~ 
Instead, the Loyalists focused on their anticipations of 
what would happen to Congressional recommendations to the 
5Parliamentary History, XXIII, 206. 
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states on property restitution and ending prosecutions. 
Franklin's son, William, former royal governor of New 
Jersey, was a leader among the American exiles in London 
opposed to ratification of the Shelburne treaty, and insist-
ent upon Parliamentary recognition of Loyalist claims. 
The Earl of Carlisle, one-time head of the American 
Peace Commission in 1778, led the attack on Shelburne in 
the House of Lords on February 17th. Carlisle claimed the 
boundaries as drawn would insure the virtual loss of all 
Canada. He decried the abandonment of the Indian tribes 
which had served the King loyally in the war, and deserved 
protection from the colonists. He ridiculed the treaty 
provision by which Congress was to make recommendations to 
the states in favor of the Loyalists. He pointed out there 
was not the slightest assurance the states would ever com-
ply with this provision. The loss of Penobscot, he added, 
would cost Great Britain its vital supply of masts for 
merchant and naval vessels. The Canadian fur trade had been 
dealt a death blow by the surrender of the forts which pro-
tected both the trade and the loyal Indians since these 
posts were located south of the lakes on territory soon to 
become American soil. So far as the free navigation of the 
Mississippi was concerned, it was a worthless concession 
by the Americans in light of the Canadian fur trade situa-
tion. In short, Great Britain, he charged, had not only 
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granted independence to its colonies, it had made needless 
additional concessions to the rebellious colonials and had 
6 
nothing to show for them in exchange. 
Shelburne answered the accusations of betrayal of the 
American Loyalists with a reiteration of the promise in the 
King's message in opening Parliament, and defended the 
treaty terms. 
I have but one answer to give the House; it is the 
same answer I gave my own bleeding heart. A part 
must be wounded that the whole of the Empire may not 
perish. If better terms could be had, think you 
My Lord, that I would not have embraced them? I 
had but the alternative either to accept the terms 
proposed or continue the war.7 
Shelburne's overall defense of the American treaty remains 
baffling. He chose not to outline his scheme of reconcilia-
tion and reunion, the plan for a close commercial tie 
between the two nations and ultimate political association 
at some future date. 
441. 
A full exposition of the Peace Treaties as a first 
instalment of revolutionary changes in imperial and 
commercial policy was obviously impracticable. To 
justify the generosity of the American Treaty on the 
ground that it would induce the "revolted Colonies" 
to enter a new form of association which would enable 
them to compete on level terms with British citizens 
throughout the Empire, would have8a provoked explo-sion of contemptuous indignation. · 
6 Ibid., 377. 
7Ibid., 411. 
8Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, 
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So instead he was forced to hint somewhat indirectly at the 
implications of free trade, a concept his listeners most 
likely understood only dimly. The weight of his arguments 
defending the terms of the American treaty had to rest 
almost wholly upon England's exhausted financial condition, 
and upon the weakness of that nation's defense posture in 
1782.9 
Shelburne went as far as he well could, denouncing 
monoplies, urging Britain's essential interest in 
free trade as a growing industrial nation, and 
pleading in particular that the Americans should be 
dealt with "on the footing of brethren." But, in-
evitably, there was something missing: the argument 
was inconclusive.10 
A more complete and convincing argument in support of 
the treaty appeared in pamphlet form shortly. Its author, 
Andrew Kippis, argued, 
It behooves those who made it, to recommend them-
selves to the public by promoting the principle 
of it, whether in or out of Government. These are 
a cordial intercourse with North America; a well-
grounded hope of returning affection, and then of 
returning union; and the universal freedom of com-
merce. It becomes those who objected t~ the peace 
equally to adhere to these principles. 
Despite the weakness inherent in Shelburne's own exposition 
of his views in support of the American Treaty, he won a 
9Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 421. 
10 Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, 
I, 441. 
11 En£!.ish Historical Documents (18 vols. London, 
1957) x,-733. 
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test of strength in the House of Lords by a thirteen-vote 
majority of February 18, 1782.12 
In Commons, Shelburne's aides were less successful in 
defending the treaty terms. The first blow came on February 
18th when the House, following the lead of John Cavendish 
who accepted the peace and American independence as neces-
sary but claimed the concessions to America were extrava-
gant, voted down the Address of Acceptance on the treaty, 
224-208. 13 Cavendish resumed the attack on February 21st 
with five new motions on the American Treaty, including one 
censuring the Ministry for its unnecessary concessions, and 
another pledging compensation to the American Loyalists by 
England. Cavendish charged, "The concessions made to the 
adversaries of Great Britain 
were entitled to .. ,,14 . . 
American Loyalists stated". 
.• are greater than they 
The motion in favor of the 
that this House do feel the 
regard due from this nation to every description of men . • • 
and to assure His Majesty that they shall take every proper 
method to relieve them 1115 On the crucial question 
of censure Shelburne's forces went down to defeat, 207 to 
190, in the early morning hours of February 22nd. Two days 
12 Parliamentary History, XXIII, 411. 
13 Ibid., 490. 
14 
Ibid., 503. 
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later on February 24th, Shelburne submitted his resignation 
to the King. 16 
The first steps toward American reconciliation and 
reunion, a peace treaty with generous terms and its ratifi-
cation, had been accomplished. But the cost had been high. 
Ratification had come only by the slenderest of margins and 
under circumstances which boded 111 for the continuation of 
this policy. Its chief architect was no longer in office 
with the resignation of Shelburne. The question now was by 
whom and through what agencies was the remainder of the pro-
gram to be pursued? 
The strange combination of two old and bitter enemies, 
Lord North and Charles James Fox, joining forces to bring 
down Shelburne was a precursor of what was to come in the 
next Ministry. From the end of February until early April, 
the King sought desperately to find some other--any other--
acceptable Cabinet leadership with sufficient support in 
Parliament. In the end he had to accept the Fox-North duo, 
technically a Ministry headed by the Duke of Portland, who 
in actuality took no active role in the Government. 17 
The interim between Shelburne's resignation and the 
King's grudging acceptance of the Fox-North Ministry 
16Ibid. 
17 Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, 
p. 431. 
127 
extended nearly seven weeks. It was during this interlude 
that a key part of the Shelburne reconciliation plan, amend-
ments to the Navigation Act, which would have permitted 
Americans a special status in Empire trade, were introducd 
and debated in Parliament. 18 The bill would have author-
ized ". American produce for the time being to enter 
British ports on the same footing as British-owned, while 
treating American ships carrying such produce as those of 
19 
other foreign states." It would have also opened up trade 
between British colonies and islands in America to American 
shipping on the same terms as if the ships and cargoes were 
British ownect. 20 While the bill was proposed as an interim 
measure, it was an essential part of Shelburne's plan to 
restore the trade between England and America, and to assure 
that this commerce was not lost to England's continental 
21 
rivals, especially France. The bill had no organized sup-
port because of Shelburne's earlier resignation. The 
Ministers who might have supported it were simply caretakers 
awaiting the King's decision in selecting new Cabinet 
18 Ibid., p. 451. 
19 Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 429. 
20 Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, 
p. 451. 
21 
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leadership. And there were dedicated foes waiting to attack 
this plan of Shelburne's as they had the American Treaty. 
The debate, March 7th, in Commons, found two of 
America's one-time advocates--Burke and Fox--as well as its 
Tory foes in opposition. William Eden, whose project for 
reconciliat1.on had been the springboard leading to the 
Carlisle Commission, declared the proposal ". . . would 
introduce a total revolution in our commercial system . . 
In addition, Eden foresaw a weakening of England's 
maritime strength since" ... the Kingdom would lose the 
great nursery for its seamen, and all the means of manning 
ships in time of emergency." 23 His arguments came largely 
from a pamphlet produced by John Holroyd, the Earl of 
Sheffield, and widely circulated in England in the spring 
of 1783. 
Sheffield's Observations on the Commerce of the Ameri-
can States reads in retrospect like a blustery tirade on 
why Britannia rules the waves. From a starting point of 
Britain's naval superiority over France, Sheffield moved on 
to claim the general superiority of British manufactured 
goods over those of all other nations and the inferior 
quality of American raw materials. Perhaps the climate of 
British public opinion welcomed a little bravado after 
22 Parliamentary History, XXIII, 602. 
23 
Ibid., 607. 
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the humiliation of 1775 to 1782. Sheffield viewed any con-
cessions to encourage American trade as completely unneces-
sary. 
Instead of exaggerating the loss suffered by the 
dismemberment of the empire, our thoughts may be 
employed to more advantage in considering what our 
situation really is, and what are the greatest 
advantages that can be derived from it. It will be 
found better than we expect; nor is the independ-
ence of the American States, notwithstanding their 
connection with France, likely to interfere with 
us . . . . 24 
In short, Britain had everything going her way in the ___ _ 
American trade. "Our remaining colonies on the continent 
and islands, and the favourable state of English manufac-
turers, may still give us almost exclusively the trade of 
America rr25 Also Sheffield pointed out the weakness 
of the United States as a trade rival operating under its 
loose Articles of Confederation, predicting Congress would 
be unable to control American shipping. Canada, peopled by 
American Loyalists and British settlers and blessed with a 
stable government, would provide the provisions, lumber and 
other goods required by the West Indies colonies which had 
formerly come from the United States. America would also 
be dependent upon Great Britain to finance its tobacco 
24John Holroyd, Observations on the Commerce of the 
American States (London, 1783) p. 101. 
25 Ibid., p. 77. 
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trade and thus England would continue to call the tune in 
26 the only significant import required from America. 
In only one respect did Sheffield perceive America as 
a threat to British commerce. The United States is not, he 
wrote 
.•• likely to interfere with us so essentially as 
has been apprehended, except as to the carrying 
trade, the nursery for seamen, and that it is in our 
power to prevent in a considerable degree • . . • 
~e must therefore retain the carrying trade where-
ever we possibly can.27 
It was Sheffield's suggestion that the Barbary pirates with 
encouragement from Great Britain would be sufficient to dis-
courage American inroads into the British carrying trade in 
the Mediterranean, and that the Navigation Acts as they 
stood would guarantee the North Atlantic and West Indies 
trade to Great Britain. For Sheffield, Britain's strength 
was her maritime supremacy, and the carrying trade the 
assurance of its source of future manpower. He was con-
vinced" ••• that the principle of the Navigation Act, must 
be kept entire, and that the carrying trade must not in any 
degree be given up. 1128 
Suddenly, the trade restoration between America and 
Great Britain became the center of a controversy involving 
26Ibid., p. 118. 
27 Ibid., p. 101. 
28Ibid., p. 121. 
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Britain's fear of France and Franco-American maritime 
power. 
Eden and Sheffield would have made little headway if 
they had been merely championing the cause of ship-
builders against merchants. The remarkable change 
in public opinion which they and a few others 
achieved was due, not to economic argumen~~ but to 
an emotional appeal, the emotion of fear. ~ 
Parliament referred the bill to Committee whence it 
emerged no longer recognizable.30 One of Shelburne's major 
efforts toward reconciliation and reunion--the restoration 
of commercial ties--was clearly in serious trouble. Mean-
while, after April 2, 1783, Charles James Fox as Foreign 
Secretary was now in complete control of any negotiations 
with the Americans in Paris on the terms of the definitive 
peace treaty, and the re-establishment of trade relations 
between England and America. Oswald was promptly replaced 
by David Hartley, a member of Parliament from Hull and an 
advocate of American reconciliation. Hartley reached Paris 
on April 24th. His instructions directed him" •.. to 
treat for opening of British and American ports for mutual 
commerce, and for trade arrangements based upon recipro-
31 
city." However, the specifics were a little less than 
29 
Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, 
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reciprocal in character. The British proposal contemplated 
the raw produce of America would be admitted into Great 
Britain just as if the Thirteen States were still colonies. 
·In return, the manufactured products of Great Britain were 
to enter the United States on the same basis. So far as the 
West Indies were concerned, the British plan would have per-
mitted Americans to have participated in that trade only 
when carrying American produce to those Islands.32 
The American Commissioners in Paris were suspicious of 
Hartley's mission and its sincerity of purpose from the out-
set. On presenting his Commission to the Americans, they 
immediately pointed out it was not under Seal. This was 
ultimately rectified three weeks later.33 Despite these 
concerns, the American Commissioners submitted to Hartley 
on April 29th proposals that " ••• the rivers, harbors, and 
ports of both countries, including areas under the dominion 
of Great Britain, be opened to the citizens of the other. 11 34 
This was reciprocity as the Americans understood it, but not 
as Hartley had been directed to negotiate. Hartley for-
warded the American proposal to London, incautiously indi-
eating his approval of these ideas. Within two weeks he had 
32Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, 
pp. 461-462. 
33auttr1dge, David Hartley, M.P., p. 306. 
34Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 431. 
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a reply from Fox stating " •.• that you have either not 
attended to or have misunderstood my Instructions • • ,,35 . . 
For Hartley's information Fox included a copy of an Order in 
Council issued May 14th in London which limited American 
exports to England to ". . • unmanufactured goods, or 
merchandizes, being the growth or production of . • • the 
United States. 11 36 The American Commissioners reacted 
angrily to this style of reciprocity which discriminated 
against American manufactured goods. From the English 
standpoint these limitations were reasonable. American 
manufactures were insignificant, but such a provision 
" .•• might enable foreign goods, which were either pro-
hibited or liable to heavy duties, to be passed off as 
American, thus giving rise to innumerable frauds."37 Ameri-
can trading habits were well known to British officialdom as 
a result of colonial experiences. 
In spite of these disappointments, Hartley and the 
American Commissioners continued meeting, Hartley suggested 
another plan to Fox on May 22nd. This would have re-
established Anglo-American trade relations on the same terms 
35Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, 
p. 467. 
36Francis Wharton, editor, The Revolutionary Diplo-
matic Correspondence of the United States {Washington, D.C., 
1889) VI.• 428 • 
37Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, 
p. 462. 
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which prevailed in 1774 before the Revolution. As proposed 
this would have opened the West Indies trade to America with 
minor limitations, and generally permitted American ships to 
enter British ports on the same terms as British ships with 
reciprocal privileges for English ships in American ports.38 
The American Commissioners demanded to know if Hartley had 
the authority to enter into such an agreement, should it be 
acceptable to them.39 He admitted he would still have to 
win Fox's and the Cabinet's approval of his plan, and agreed 
to attempt it. Fox's response directed Hartley to proceed, 
but it was filled with warning signals. The United States 
must be barred from the carrying trade between the West 
Indies and Great Britain, Fox emphaslzed. He also ". . • 
stressed the point that Britain had already granted to the 
Americans special privileges which were denied other 
nations •••• " in the tobacco and rice trade through the 
June 6th Orders in Counci1. 40 
Another draft agreement was sent to London on June 
20th. The Americans were increasingly suspicious of Hart-
ley1 s proposals which they accepted, but came back from 
38 Ibid., 469. 
39 Guttridge, David Hartley, M.P., p. 310. 
40Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Er_!lpire, 
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London rejected. 41 "In a word, it appears that his full 
powers, which he had then received, authorized him to do 
nothing," Henry Laurens reported to Philadelphia on June 
17th. 42 John Adams was equally pessimistic in his evalua-
tion, writing to Secretary Livingston on June 23rd, "I see 
no prospect of agreeing on any regulation of commerce here. 
The present ministry are afraid of every knot of mer-
chants. 1143 The final blow to American hopes was the Order 
in Council July 2, 1783, which completely barred American 
shipping from the West Indies trade while 
••• providing that American produce (i.e., all 
kinds of lumber, livestock, cereals, and vegetables 
might be imported into the British West Indies, and 
that West Indian rum, molasses, coffee, cocoa-nuts, 
ginger and pimento might be exported to the United 
,States under the same regulations ~nd duties as if 
exported to British North America.44 
Adams wrote bitterly, "A jealousy of American ships, 
seamen, carrying trade and naval power appears every day 
more and more conspicuous. 1145 Not only were the Americans 
disappointed at the results of the commercial negotiations, 
Britain's representative, Hartley, appears to have believed 
41 Ibid., p. 476. 
42 The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the 
United States, VI, 503. 
43Ibid., 501 
44 Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, 
p. 47§. 
45The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the 
United States, VI, 540. 
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his confidence had been abused by the Ministry. "Last eve-
ning Mr. Hartley spent two hours with me, and appeared much 
chagrined at the Proclamation which had never been com-
municated to him by his principals," Adams noted to Living-
ston on July 17th. 46 
Meanwhile, the answers to why the once promising out-
look from a restoration of the Anglo-American had withered 
were to be found in the quiet efforts of Lord North and 
William Knox, former• undersecretary of the American Depart-
ment, to scuttle the whole idea. At North's invitation in 
May, Knox went" ... to work wlth the avowed purpose of 
defeating the American policy advocated by the Foreign 
Secretary, Fox, . ,,47 Explaining his program some six 
years later, Knox said: 
My general and correct knowledge of the whole 
course of the American circuitous trade enabled me 
to judge in what part of the chain the cutting out 
a link would most effectually interrupt its pro-
gress and divert the navigation into our channel. 
I therefore determined to • • • frame the regula-
tions for the intercourse between the United States 
and British West India Islands4go as utterly to exclude the American shipping. 
There seems little doubt that Knox was successful in his 
efforts. "My draught of a bill • • • 'was converted into 
46 
Ibid., 557. 
47Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, 
p. 479. 
48 
Ibid. 
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the Order in Council, passed the 2nd of July, i783, which 
I wish may be engraved upon my tombstone, as having saved 
the navigation of England, 11149 Knox boasted. 
Thus, Knox whose service under Hillsborough, Dart-
mouth and Germain in the American Department, had been based 
on the principle that the duty of colonies was to be ". 
subservient to the maritime strength and commercial in-
terests of Great Britain ... " struck a final blow at 
Shelburne's reconciliation and reunion policy.SO When the 
July 2nd Order in Council reached Paris negotiations were 
suspended. There was no point in further talks. The com-
mercial treaty languished quietly and was dead by the time 
the terms of the definitive treaty were signed on September 
3, 1783. 
In the end, reconciliation and reunion as a policy 
could be no stronger than the men who espoused it. Without 
leaders of stature--politicians tough enough to command 
respect--it was a rudderless ship. From the hopeful begin-
nings in the springtime of 1782 it had run its course. At 
the end of the voyage were the rocks of patriotic emotional-
ism based upon fear, and the political realism of clinging 
to mercantilism of the past. 
49 Ibid., 480. 
50 
Ibid., 479. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE TREATY OF PARIS AND BRITAIN'S 
RECONCILIATION POLICY 
Reconciliation and reunion was an option of British 
policy throughout the American Revolutionary period from 
prewar 1774 through postwar 1783. It was a less signifi-
cant option of American policy as well. Throughout this 
thesis I have sought to document and trace this policy's 
evolution in these years, pulling together the scattered 
threads from other more frequently considered themes. Still, 
there remain questions for which answers must be attempted 
in a final evaluation of this neglected viewpoint and its 
impact on a major assumption in American diplomatic history. 
Why did reconciliation fail? What was the signifi-
cance of Britain's policy on the final terms of the Treaty 
of Paris? Does this policy cause a re-evaluation of the 
earlier assessments of the American diplomacy at Paris? 
There was a surprising consistency in the reconcil-
iation and reunion option of British policy throughout the 
period considered. It was always a part of every British 
plan of strategy though sometimes muted because of its tan-
dem role with military and naval efforts. On occasion, in 
139 
the American Peace Commission of 1778, and again during the 
diplomacy of peace in 1782, the plan for reconciliation and 
reunion became a dominant factor. 
On the other hand, despite its constancy, it is 
equally obvious that this policy altered shape and form to 
a considerable extent over the years of its existence. Lord 
North's Conciliatory Proposals of 1775 bear little resem-
blance to the offers borne by Lord Carlisle's American Peace 
Commission and less to Lord Shelburne's ultimate reconcilia-
tion efforts at Paris. Reconciliation and reunion evolved 
in response to the fortunes of war, diplomatic pressures 
upon Great Britain and domestic events at home. Perhaps its 
greatest consistency were the forces which encouraged men 
to pursue this policy in an effort first to prevent, and 
then to halt the war. 
In retrospect, it seems almost incredible that men of 
goodwill in both America and England were unable to find the 
key to reconciliation. The pamphlets, diaries and Parlia-
mentary debates of this period are studded with references 
to the ties which held together England and its North 
American colonies. Shelburne wrote of links of 11 • • • blood 
• • • principles • . . 1 habits. 11 which united England and 
America. Galloway, an American, observed that '! • • • the 
l 
Fitzmaurice, The Life of William Petty, Earl of Shel-
burne, p. 169. 
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people of America are favourable and friendly to our 
cause."2 The Americans steadfastly based their appeals for 
the repeal of distasteful Parliamentary measures or changes 
in Ministerial policy on their rights as Englishmen or upon 
what they understood to be the British constitution. Thus, 
it would appear an entire scheme of common traditions, 
political thought, language, and predominantly Protestant 
religious background was working in favor of reconciliation 
and reunion both prior to and during the hostilities. 
Though men spoke of a common heritage, shared tradi-
tions and the same religious principles, there is also 
counter evidence of enormous differences between England and 
America in 1774. American institutions--political and 
religious--had long since began to deviate from those in 
England under the pressure of New World experiences. These 
institutions were also influenced by the thousands of set-
tlers from continental European nations who had joined the 
English colonists in North America. America was not England 
transplanted to another continent in either institutions, 
people or spirit. Scattereq in small sea coast cities and 
in a sparsely populated wilderness, the Americans had become 
by 1774 significantly different from Britons. 
2aalloway, Historical and Political Reflections on the 
Rise and Progress of the American R~bellion, p. 55. 
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Nor could Americans willingly accept the role of 
political and economic subservience in which they were cast 
by at least some Englishmen. Attitudes are at best impre-
cise. There is, however, considerable evidence which sup-
ports the statement that colonies and colonials were created 
as subordinate beings to serve the purposes of their crea-
tors. "From this self-evident position, that colonies can 
no longer be serviceable to a state, than they continue in 
subordination to it, we must deduce our arguments," one 
writer declared in 1776.3 Over and over Americans including 
Benjamin Franklin and all of the men who served as colonial 
agents in London, experienced that subtle but pervasive 
British condescension toward those who are of a lesser 
breed. King George III wrote of the knavery of Americans. 
Lord Sheffield ridiculed their pretension to trade. There 
were indeed powerful forces pushing both America and England 
toward reconciliation through 168 years of common background 
and political affiliation. They were savagely undercut by 
the inability of many Britons to see colonies and· colonists 
in any other than a subordinate role. 
The sinews of trade between Britain's North American 
colonies and home island were another factor which should 
have been a considerable force for reconciliation and 
3Anonymous, Considerations on the American War (London, 
1776) p. 15. 
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reunion. It was the support of British merchants trading 
to North America which had brought sufficient pressures upon 
Parliament in 1766 to repeal of the Stamp Act. When the 
final crisis came in 1774-1775, the one-time supporters of 
the American viewpoint were disinterested. 
The merchants' interest in American affairs and the 
influence they could exert in behalf of the colo-
nies had waned. As Burke noted, the commercial com-
munities opposed to North's Administration "have not 
been much regarded," while the "manufacturing parts 
of the Kingdom" urged that "the reduction by force 
of the disobedient spirit in the Colonies is their 
Sole security for trading in future with America. 11 4 
As the war progressed the value of the North American 
colonies as trading partners continued to decline. Adam 
Smith and others advocated American independence as a posi-
tive benefit to British trade. 
. . . I am glad, that America has declared herself 
independent of us, though for reasons very opposite 
to theirs. America, I have proved beyond the pos-
sibility of a confutation, ever was a millstone 
hanging about the neck of this country to weight it 
down, 
wrote Josiah Tucker, Dean of Gloucester Cathedral, in 1783. 
" ••• trade depends on Interest alone, and on no other 
Connection or Obligation," .he added. 5 
Sheffield's pamphlet and its appeal to British patriot-
ism was a final and devastating blow to the favorable forces 
4Michael Kammen, A Rope of Sand, p. 305. 
5Josiah Tucker, Four Letters on Important National 
Subjects Addressed to the Earl of Shelburne (London, 1783) 
pp. 7-9. 
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engendered by the trade ties between America and England. 
His reasoned analysis against any commercial concessions to 
American trade in the crucial period when the North-Fox 
Ministry was preparing to take over destroyed Shelburne's 
last move toward reconciliation. One of Sheffield's sup-
porters· summed up a feeling shared by many Britons before 
and after the war when he wrote, "The Colonies were orig-
inally settled to promote the navigation of England by 
creating a great employment of ships. 116 In a simple, short 
sentence the people of America were reduced to an economic 
asset of the British Empire, helpful if properly subser-
vient, but disposable if required. 
Another force pressuring England's leaders toward 
reconciliation and reunion emerged only after the military 
conflict began. It was the enormous financial and human 
cost of conquering America--a matter which was greatly 
underestimated by the North Ministry at the outset. British 
generals from Gage to Cornwallis pleaded for adequate man-
power and were forced instead to make do with German mer-
cenaries, Indian irregulars and American Loyalists.7 
England simply was unable to recruit adequate manpower 
within its own nation to fight a colonial war and a global 
war simultaneously. 
6aeorge Chalmers, Opinions on Interesting Subjects of 
Public Law and Commercial Policy Arising from American Inde-
pendence (London, 1784) p. 93. 
7Robson, The American Revolution, pp. 114, 115. 
' ~·-
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The financial burden for England of a stalemated, but 
expanding warfare both in America and elsewhere was another 
motivator favoring reconciliation and reunion. Hartley 
dubbed it, "A war which I can call by no other name than a 
war of Ministers against the sentiments and real interests 
of their country."8 By 1780 the war had cost the Kingdom 
at least~l00,000,000.9 This meant increased taxes which 
the constituency represented by the country gentlemen in 
Parliament would have to pay. It was the desertion of this 
faction from Lord North which sent his Ministry down to 
defeat in March, 1782. But both before and after that event 
the costs of world-wide warfare were exerting increasing 
pressures for peace, and for reconciliation and reunion. 
The strains introduced by the long colonial war in 
America also heated up pressures for domestic reforms within 
England's Parliamentary structure, and added to the forces 
of reconciliation and reunion. Government corruption, mis-
management and waste were revealed by the desperate measures 
necessity imposed on Lord North's administration. The rise 
of the County associations and the frightening Lord Gordon 
riots were both indications that sheer incompetence could 
conceivably topple the entire government structure. The 
8Hartley, An Address to the Committee of the County 
of' York, p. 25. 
9 Ibid., p. 6. 
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mismanagement of military and naval matters which cost the 
nation whole armies, fleets and possessions seemed to go 
far beyond mere miscalculation. All of these elements added 
fuel to the demands for reconciliation and reunion so that 
the nation could move to remedy its critical deficiencies at 
home. 
Diplomatically, Great Britain by 1782 had become iso-
lated from Europe. She was at war with America, France, 
Spain and Holland. On paper, at least, the nations of most 
of Europe were aligned against her in an armed neutrality 
headed by Russia. From a pinnacle of power at the Peace of 
Paris in 1763 Britain had slipped dangerously close to the 
precipice of facing a European continent united against her. 
At the heart of Britain's diplomatic isolation was an issue 
as emotional and bitter any nation has ever faced--the 
alliance between France and the American colonies. 
It was an unnatural alliance in the eyes of many. A 
Joining of forces between rebellious colonials and Britain"s 
traditional continental and Catholic enemy was a vicious 
repudiation of all which Britain stood for. It might be 
comparable in today's world perhaps, to the state of Alaska 
declaring its independence of the United States and signing 
a military alliance with Japan. What made the Franco-
American alliance even more frightening than the centuries 
of enmity across the channel was a widely held belief in the 
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economic potential of America. A substantial portion of 
the United Kingdom's maritime strength in 1776 was American-
built.10 America had been a key source of British naval 
supplies as well as shipping. Now suddenly these former 
Imperial assets were to be made available to England's most 
powerful continental enemy. William Eden posed the fear 
which was the mainspring of much of the forces of reconcilia-
tion and reunion when he said the question facing Britain 
was 
••. whether we shall be deprived of our dependen-
cies, be stript of our maritime power, become total 
and immediate bankrupts to all the world and hold a 
crippled trade and commerce hereafter at the good-
will and compassion of the House of Bourbon.11 
And if the immediate military and naval outlook were insuf-
ficiently gloomy, those who looked ahead to future American 
growth linked to French ambitions were even more fearful. 
The possibility of France supplanting Great Britain as 
America's trading partner added to the fears raised by con-
templating the future impact of the Franco-American alli-
ance. If there is one thread which runs through writings of 
contemporary Americans and Britons who labored for recon-
ciliation and reunion, it is the weight and urgency given 
by all to the alliance between the rebellious North Ameri-
can colonies and France. 
10Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, 
p. 475. 
11 Eden, Four Letters to the Earl of Carlisle, p. 48. 
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From the American standpoint the forces of reconcil-
iation and reunion were substantially weaker than those 
exerted within the British establishment. They were none-
theless real. The war was essentially a military stalemate 
with the Americans never able to drive the enemy from their 
major cities and seaports. The countryside and the sea 
coast were always vulnerable to raids in force. The threat 
of Indian attack hung over the frontier. Destruction of 
property and livelihood was widespread. Galloway's estimate 
that not more than one-fifth of the Americans supported 
Congress from choice may have been low. 12 But it seems clear 
that less than a majority of the inhabitants of the North 
American colonies were active supporters of the rebellion. 
And the Franco-American allia11ce was a factor in America, 
too. It was the issue which divided Congress into pro-
French and anti-French factions. For the deep emotional com-
pulsions of traditional enmity and religion ran through the 
American consciousness. It moved some men like Galloway to 
seek reconciliation and reunion over independence. 
There were also powerful forces against reconciliation 
and reunion from the English standpoint. A fear of the con-
sequences of concessions to the North American colonies was 
widespread. The impact on the West Indian sugar islands, 
12 
p. 14. 
Galloway, Considerations on the American Enquiry, 
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Canada and, even closer to home, on Ireland, were incalcu-
lable. The American example plus the dislocation of trade 
which resulted from the American War produced conditions 
close to rebellion in Ireland in 1778-1779. The result was 
action in Parliament in the winter of 1779-1780 to remove 
restrictions which had formerly applied to Irish exports. 13 
Further concessions to America could have unraveled the 
fabric of empire from Bengal to Bermuda. Trade losses to 
colonies, which might have been a powerful factor for recon-
ciliation and reunion, were lightly felt. Through devious 
channels trade continued between Britain and America 
throughout the war. 
Perhaps the most potent o~ all factors militating 
against reconciliation and reunion was the eternal optimism 
of the British military and naval commanders. There was 
always the hope that this year's campaign or next year's 
efforts would be the final blow, shattering the rebel armies 
and encouraging loyal subjects to return to their allegiance 
to the crown. There were successes which encouraged the 
British expectations--Howe's capture of Philadelphia, the 
rebel capital in 1777, the fall of Charleston in 1780 and 
the successful defense of Savannah in 1779--were all indi-
cators pointing toward victory. 
13 Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, 
p. 524. 
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In the end reconciliation and. reunion failed as 
policy. From the American viewpoint the reasons can be 
summed up briefly. First and foremost the initiative for 
action on this policy was essentially British. Britain's 
actions were behind the surge of events. If Britain had 
offered in 1775 the terms--dominion status--which the 
American Peace Commission brought to the colonies in 1778, 
they might well have been accepted. Once the Franco-
American treaty was signed, William Eden's efforts were 
futile. 
Shelburne's sounding in 1782 were a furtherance of the 
same futility. Though never fully disclosed, the grand out-
line of a federal alliance and colonial autonomy, could well 
have been acceptable to a war-weary America had it been 
offered at the right moment in 1780. By Yorktown, or in 
1782, the opportunity had slipped away. 
There are other elements which made reconciliation and 
reunion unlikely elements in the American equation. The 
British Ministry had destroyed its own credibility with its 
dualism of policy. Coercion was combined with appeals for 
a return to the old allegiance. Appeals to a common heritage 
and ancient shared traditions were mixed with threats of 
punishment. Political dissension was answered with troops. 
Military commanders came to America empowered to both sub-
due and conciliate. In the process British policy became 
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blurred and ambiguous and uncertain. To Americans recon-
ciliation and submission appeared to be not much different. 
And the advantages which might accrue to Americans through 
reconciliation were foreseen in greater substance through 
independence. War-time patriotism with its emotional claims 
was the final blow dealt American reconciliation and re-
union. 
. surely there is more reason to convince us 
that the Americans, dreading the ambitious designs 
of' their insidious ally; destitute of the great re-
sources of war; without men and without money; 
their commerce lost, their forces generally de-
feated, and their country ruined by the ravages 
and expences of the war, will see their own 
interest, and embrace those terms when offered 
which they would have accepted in the time of their 
prosperity~ 
Galloway wrote with conviction. 14 His fellow Americans 
found otherwise. 
The failure of reconciliation and reunion in Britain 
was in part a result of the interaction to the American 
response as well as a result of its own internal weaknesses 
of formulation and implementation. In the years before 
hostilities began and even prior to 1778 during the war 
itself, the absence of foreign intervention provided a fer-
tile seedbed for the nurturing of reconciliation and re-
union. Neither the men nor the measures were available to 
14aalloway, Historical and Political Reflections on the 
Rise and Progress of the American Rebellion, p. 129. 
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·make it a reality. Those who advocated it were a minority 
in Parliament and Great Britain. Instead there was a de-
termination on the part of the Ministry and the majority in 
Parliament to pursue coercion and submission as the solution 
to the American problem. After 1778 the Franco-American 
Alliance became a monumental emotional and diplomatic road 
block to reconciliation and reunion. 
Another aspect of the inability of the reconciliation 
and reunion movement to speak from strength was its identi-
fication with the reform element. Those who spoke most fre-
quently for America were men like Shelburne, Barre, Burke, 
Rockingham, Chatham, Wilkes and Hartley. They were also men 
linked to the forces of change, to economic doctrines at 
odds with mercantilism and seekers· for electoral reform and 
government efficiency. The issue of reform attached itself 
most closely to Shelburne and no doubt contributed to the 
defeat he suffered in connection with the ratification of 
the Treaty of Paris. 
Moreover, the essence of Shelburne's Toryism was 
its radical quality. Not only must the constitu-
tion be reinvigorated by a reform of Parliament, 
but the financial and fiscal systems must be re-
modelled to suit the needs of a new age.15 
15 Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, 
p. 408. 
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To be sure the strength of the reform group, which tended 
by and large to be composed of the same individuals support-
ing reconciliation and reunion with America, had its peaks 
and valleys. Early 1780 saw the Association movement at its 
zenith. It went into a decline in the general revulsion 
toward ·dissidents which followed the Lord Gordon riots in 
June, 1780. Again in early 1782 when Parliament halted the 
war in America by its vote on General Conway's motion, the 
reform group was strong. Reform power was ebbing by late 
1782 after the spectacular naval victory over the French 
at the Battle of the Saints in April, 1782 and the failure 
of the siege of Gibraltar in September of the same year. 
Perhaps one cause for the failure of reconciliation 
and reunion was the fact it dealt in concepts and ideas un-
familiar to eighteenth century minds. From their earliest 
beginnings the colonies in North America had been conceived 
as dependencies which added to the political and economic 
strength of Great Britain. Now Adam Smith was arguing that 
exactly the opposite was true, " •.• that under a mercan-
tilist system Britain received nothing but loss from her 
control of colonies . Here was a refutation of a 
truth which generations accepted. The past and what it 
stands for has a stubborn way of lingering in the minds of 
16Ibid., p. 488. 
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men long after the circumstances of the past have vanished. 
The comfortable, conventional wisdom of colonial subser-
vience expounded by William Knox and Lord Sheffield found 
far more willing listeners than did the novel economic doc-
trines of Andrew Kippis and Lord Shelburne. 
What was the ultimate impact of this policy of recon-
ciliation and reunion upon the diplomacy which produced the 
Treaty of Paris and American independence? 
Beyond a doubt it weighed heavily in the terms of the 
settlement through influences exerted for several reasons. 
Chance, luck and some skillful maneuvering by the American 
Peace Commission placed the direction of England negotia-
tions for peace in the hands of Lord Shelburne, the leading 
advocate of reconciliation and reunion. Charles James Fox, 
foreign secretary, almost succeeded in snatching the reins 
away from Shelburne. But even the tempting offer of inde-
pendence Fox's representative, Thomas Grenville, brought to 
Paris in May, 1782 was not enough for Franklin to abandon 
Shelburne. Instead, Franklin shrewdly encouraged the rift' 
between Grenville and Oswald, and the Cabinet conflict in 
England between Fox and Shelburne.17 The death of Rocking-
ham put the exponent of reconciliation and reunion on whom 
Franklin was betting, in complete control of negotiations. 
17 Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 279. 
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The Shelburne conception of peace was a generous one. 
That it shall be done decidedly, so as to avoid all 
future risk of enmity, and lay the foundation of a 
new connection better adapted to the present temper 
and interests of both countries . • 
18 
were the instructions to Oswald on July 27, 1782. Those 
words succinctly sum up the grand strategy of long range 
reconciliation and reunion pursued by Shelburne and his 
emissary, Oswald. 
The terms of the Treaty of Paris were as generous as 
Shelburne intended them to be--so generous they cost him his 
place in government. The terms began with the absolute 
independence the Americans demanded. They included bound-
aries which exceeded those which even America's French and 
Spanish allies thought reasonable. 19 In a conversation with 
the French diplomat, Gerard Reyneval, shortly before the 
conclusion of the preliminary American treaty, Shelburne 
said, 
••• there would be little difficulty about Bound-
arys with the American Commissioners, providing the 
Article relative to the Loyalists was express 1 d in 
so comprehensive a manner as to acquit Your 
Majesty . • .20 
Of course, the articles on the Loyalists as finally written 
in the treaty were scarcely worth the paper on which they 
18Fitzmaur1ce, The Life of William P~tty, Earl of 
Shelburne, p. 169. 
l9Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 391. 
2
°Fortescue, Correspondence of King George III, VI, 
161. 
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appeared so far as protecting the lives or the property of 
Loyalists. Finally, timing played a critical role in shap-
ing the Treaty of Paris. Lord Shelburne's shakey position 
demanded that the peace treaty be accomplished before Par-
liament resumed in the fall of 1782 or else the whole 
structure of peace he was seeking to build might collapse 
in the fall on his Ministry. 21 Hence there was an enormous 
pressure upon Shelburne's representatives to find compro-
mises and make concessions to the Americans in an effort 
to bring the negotiations to a quick end. 
The impact of Britain's policy of reconciliation and 
reunion was enormous. It established the outlines of the 
agreement through its conceptualization of an ultimate 
reunion between England and America. The specific terms of 
the treaty were shaped by the expectations of the recon-
ciliation and reunion policy. The tactics of negotiation 
placed the British negotiators in a critically weak bargain-
ing position in the vital final weeks when Shelburne des-
perately sought his final agreement before Parliament's 
reopening in December, 1782. All of these factors were 
beyond the grasp of American control. True, Franklin ex-
ploited the British policy to America's benefit by steering 
negotiations away from Fox, and encouraging Shelburne's 
representatives. 
21Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 372. 
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Have American historians such as Bemis and Morris 
given America's Peace Commissioners at Paris more credit 
than their diplomatic record deserves? Before answering 
that question, let us recall the statements by Bemis and 
Morris, analyzing and praising the success of American di-
plomacy at Paris. 
Their action was the first decisive step to loose 
a new nation • • • • so that their people after 
them might have freedom to expand . • . • The 
greatest victory in the annals of American diplo-
macy • • •• 
writes Bemis. 22 Morris confirms Bemis by calling the Ameri-
can diplomacy at Paris " ••• remarkable •••• From begin-
ning to end they remained unswerving on the score of obtain-
ing both absolute independence and a continental domain 
,,23 Both Bemis and Morris agree on the success of . . 
American diplomacy, and on the criteria for gauging it--
independence and territorial concessions from Great Britain. 
Independence was never a serious question after the 
fall of the North Ministry on March 20, 1782. The Rocking-
ham Cabinet took office on a pledge from the King he would 
not veto it. For a short time Shelburne explored the pos-
sibilities of independence coupled with some sort of union 
or alliance between Great Britain and America. By July, 
22Bemls, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution, 
p. 256. 
23 Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 459. 
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1782 he had abandoned even this remote possibility for 
absolute independence and a future hope of reunion. Inde-
pendence was no sticking point in the negotiations for 
either Shelburne or for Fox if events had given the nego-
tiators' role to him. 
On boundaries it is equally clear, the British were 
determined to make peace generously in hope of future 
American friendship and trade. British demands on the old 
Northwest Territory were intended to produce nothing more 
than somewhat better terms for the American Loyalists, 
Shelburne's own statement on that score indicates an intent 
to provide the new nation with spacious boundaries. These 
would encourage westward expansion and hopefully divert 
American interest from a maritime rivalry with Great 
Britain. 
So the answer to the question of American diplomacy is 
clear. The pursuit of Britain's neglected policy of recon-
ciliation and reunion leads to no other conclusion than that 
Bemis and Morris have overstated the case for the success of 
Franklin, Jay and Adams. An examination of the British side 
of the negotiating ledger shows as many entries as does the 
American. A large part of proclaimed American success re-
veals itself as British policy not American skill. Both 
British policy as well as American objectives must be 
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considered before a balanced picture of the Anglo-American 
diplomacy at the Treaty of Paris emerges in full detail. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
SOURCES CONSULTED BUT NOT CITED 
Anonymous. ~ l'._~opo~i tion _.£or_ th~ __ _P.~esent :pe~~e ar]_d_ Fut_ure 
Government of the British Colonies in North America. 
--------London, 1775. 
Beloff, Max. 
1949. 
The Debate on the American Revolution. London, 
Lewis, George C., ed. Gove~nment_Q._f De~ende~cies. Essay 
on Colonies. Adam Smith. Washington, D.C., 1901. 
Ramsay, Allan. A Plan of Reconciliation Between Great 
Britain and Her Colonies Founded in Justice and 
Constitutional Security. London, 1776. 
Anonymous. 
War. 
Reflections on the Present State of the American 
London, 1776. 
Selby, F. G., ed. Burke's Speech on Conciliation with 
America. London, 1956. 
Squire, Marjorie J., ed. British Views of the American 
Revolution. Chicago, 1965. --- ------
Anonymous. Thoughts of a Traveller Upon Our American 
Disputes. London, 1774. 
OTHER SOURCES 
Anonymous. A Plain State of the Arguments Between Great 
Britain and Her Colonies. London, 1775. 
Alvord, Clarence. Lord Shelburne and the Founding of 
British-American Goodwill. Oxford, 1925. 
Barger, B. D. Lord Dartmouth and American Revolution. 
University of South Carolina Press, 1965. 
Bemis, Samuel F. The Hussey-Cumberland Mission and American 
Independence. Gloucester, Massachusetts, (1968) 1928. 
. The Diplomacy of the American Revolution. 
~~--=B~loomington, Indiana, (1957r-1935. 
Boorstein, Daniel J. The Americans, The Colonial Exper-
ience. New York, 1958. 
Brown, Gerald. The American Secretary, Lord Germain. Ann 
Arbor, 1963. 
Brown, Weldon A. Empire or Independence. Port Washington, 
New York, (1941) 1960. 
Cartwright, John. American Independence, the Interest and 
Glory of Great Britain. London, 1775. 
Chalmers, George. Opinions on Interesting Subjects of Pub-
lic Law and Commercial Policy Arising from American 
Independence. London, 1784. 
Christie, I. R. Crisis of Empire, Great Britain and the 
American Colonies. N.ew York, 1966. 
Commager, Henry, and Richard B. Morris, eds. The Spirit of 
'Seventy-Six. New York, 1958. 
Anonymous. Considerations on the American War. London, 
1776. 
162 
Anonymous. Considerations on the Expediency of Admitting 
Representatives from the American Colonies into the 
British House of Commons. London, 1770. 
Eden, William. Four Letters to the Earl of Carlisle from 
William Eden, Esq. London, 1779. 
Fitzmaurice, Edmond. The Life of William Petty, Earl of 
Shelburne. 2 vols. London, 1960. 
Fortescue, Sir John, ed. Correspondence of King George III. 
6 vols. London, 1928. 
Galloway, Joseph. Considerations Upon the American Enquiry. 
London, 1779. 
Historical and Political Reflections on the Rise 
and Progress of the American Rebellion. London, 1780. 
Gipson, Lawrence H. The Coming of the Revolution. New 
York, 1954. 
Guttridge, George. David Hartley, M.P. Berkeley, 1926. 
Hale, Edward E. and Edward E. Hale, Jr. Franklin in France. 
2 vols. New York, 1969 1887. 
Harlow, Vincent T. The Founding of the Second British 
Empire. 2 vols. London, 1952. 
Hartley, David. An Address to the Committee of the County of 
York on the State of_ Public Affairs. London, 1781. · 
Holroyd, John. 
States. 
Observations on the Commerce of the American 
London, 1783. 
Kammen, Michael G. Empire and Interest. New York, 1970. 
A Rope of Sand. New York, 1974. 
Kurtz, Stephen G. and James H. Hutson, eds. Essays on the 
American Revolution. New York, 1973. 
Long, J. C. George III, The Story of a Complex Man. New 
York, 1960. 
Mackesey, Piers. The War for America. Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts, 1965. 
Morris, Richard B. The Peacemakers. New York, 1965. 
. The American Revolution Reconsidered. New 
~~~=Y-ork, 1967. 
163 
The American Revolution, 1763-1783. New York, 
1970. 
Namier, Lewis. England in the Age of the American Revolu-
tion. New York, 1961. 
Norris, John. Shelburne and Reform. London, 1963. 
Pulteney, William. Thoug!!_ts on the Present State. of Affairs 
with America and the Means of Conciliation. London, 1778. 
Robson, Eric. The American Revolution in its Political and 
Military Aspects. New York, 1966. 
Rossiter, Clinton. The First American Revolution. New 
York, 1953. 
Smyth, Albert, ed. The Writings of Benjamin Franklin. New 
York, 1906. 
Stephens, Leslie and Sidney Lee, eds. The Dictionary of 
National Biography. 22 vols. London, (1950) f8B5. 
Stevens, B. F. Facsimilies of Manuscripts in European 
Archives Relating to America, 1775 to 1783. 25 vols. 
London, 1889-1895. 
Stourzh, Gerald. Benjamin Franklin and American Foreign 
Policy. Chicago, 1954. 
Syrett, Harold C., ed. American Historical Documents. 
New York, 1960. 
Tucker, Josiah. Four Letters on Important Subjects 
Addressed to the Earl of Shelburne. London, 1783. 
Van Alstyne, Richard. Empire and Independence. New York, 
1965. 
Ver Steeg, Clarence L. and Richard Hofstrader, eds. Great 
Issues in American Histor~ From Settlement to Revo-
lution. New York, 1969. 
164 
Watson, J. Steven. The Reign of George III. Oxford, 1960. 
Wharton, Francis, ed. The Revolutionary DJJ?_lomatic Cor-
r55~ondence of the United States. Washington, D.C., 
9. 
Williams, T. Harry. A. Lincoln, Selected Speeches, Mes-
sages and Letters. New York, 1957. 
Wright, Edmond, ed. Causes and Consequences of the American 
Revolution. Chicago, 1966. 
English His~ortcal Documents. 18 vols. London, 1957. 
Journals of the Continental Congress. 39 vols. Washington, 
D.C., 1908. 
The Parliamentary History of England. 29 vols. London, 
1814 (New York, 1966). 
